Economic nationalism is a specific type of ideologically driven economic programme, more aligned with ideology than with scientific theory, that advocates for the interests of one national group over those of individuals and especially over other ethnic groups. The basic literature on economic nationalism in the past and present includes: Helga Schultz and Eduard Kubů, eds., History and Culture of Economic Nationalism in East Central Europe (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006). Stefan Berger and Thomas Fetzer, eds., Nationalism and Economy: Explorations into a Neglected Relationship (Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2019). Andreas Pickel, ed., Handbook of Economic Nationalism (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2022). Viewing issues of nationhood and the economy through the lens of economic nationalism enables us “to tell stories about the economy, wealth, power, identity, sovereignty, and space”. Natalie Koch, “The Political Geography of Economic Nationalism,” in Andreas Pickel, ed., Handbook of Economic Nationalism (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2022), 15. On a broad scale, economic nationalism may manifest as a state-backed policy of self-sufficiency aimed at advancing its own economic aims through various measures, most notably protectionism. It can also significantly shape the actions and business practices of individual entrepreneurs and companies at the local level, to the extent that they may behave irrationally from a purely economic standpoint. For example, entrepreneurs may refuse to do business with potential partners or serve certain customers because of differing political views or national identities. In this context, the main way for customers to express their dissatisfaction is to boycott a particular business or entrepreneur that does not align with their national identity. Therefore, when nationalism spills over into the business world, it can have a strong, often negative, impact on the economy, as it can, at least in extreme cases, lead to the financial collapse and bankruptcy of an entrepreneur. Businessmen and merchants, therefore, need to be careful about the image they project to avoid punishment, such as a broken window display or a boycott.

The ideology of economic nationalism was widespread across 19th-century Europe as a vital tool in nation-building. While the primary aims of nationalist movements were to forge nations composed of individuals with a strong sense of belonging to a broader ethnic group, it was also believed that political and cultural progress needed to be underpinned by economic strength. A well-rounded and developed nation, therefore, required a synergy of all these elements. This fostered the nationalist view that the economy should serve only a specific group, not others, in the nation’s interest. Consequently, this often led to the creation of parallel economic systems, accompanied by segregation and self-imposed isolation. A typical example in Austria-Hungary was the implementation of parallel systems within the cooperative movement, Torsten Lorenz, ed., Cooperatives in Ethnic Conflicts: Eastern Europe in the 19th and Early 20th Century (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006). where the network of cooperatives was divided along national and political lines, so that multiple cooperatives in the same village were not uncommon. For further information on the history of Slovenian cooperative movement, see: Žarko Lazarević, Marta Rendla, and Janja Sedlaček, Zgodovina zadružništva v Sloveniji (1856–1992) (Ljubljana: Zadružna zveza Slovenije, 2023). While these ideals were successfully realised in some areas, there were many instances where this remained only a theoretical aspiration – a propagandistic call to action in the press and political speeches – since achieving complete self-reliance was a challenging, if not impossible, task. There was still considerable overt or covert collaboration among the officially competing networks. Small-scale merchants from different ethnic groups had few options available and sourced their goods from the same suppliers. In short, practice often diverged significantly from theory and political slogans.

This article examines business failures in Slovenian rural areas during the Austro-Hungarian period, largely attributable to economic nationalism. The Austro-Hungarian era was characterised by national tensions and conflicts, especially among Slovenians, Germans, and Italians. The Duchy of Carniola, covering most of present-day Slovenian territory, had a Slovenian majority, with fewer nationalist tensions. Conversely, the region of Lower Styria, in the eastern part of today’s Slovenia, included towns such as Maribor/Marburg, Celje/Cilli, and Ptuj/Pettau, which had a German majority, For further information on the history of Germans in these towns during the Austro-Hungarian period, see: Janez Cvirn, Trdnjavski trikotnik: politična orientacija Nemcev na Spodnjem Štajerskem (1861–1914) (Maribor: Založba Obzorja, 1997). whereas the rural areas were mostly Slovenianised. For example, according to the 1910 census, six out of seven people in Ptuj declared German as the language they use daily, while in the surrounding rural areas, 95% of inhabitants – afflicted by typical peasant issues of the time, such as fragmented estates and slow agricultural modernisation – chose Slovenian as their main language. Ljubica Šuligoj, “Ptuj – ‘nemška trdnjava’ na slovenskem Štajerskem,” in Bojan Terbuc, ed., Septembrski dogodki 1908: zbornik (Ptuj: Zgodovinsko društvo, 1998), 14, 17. A similar situation existed in the western Slovenian regions, roughly along today’s Slovenian border with Italy: the city of Trieste/Trst/Triest, the Monarchy’s main port, was mostly Italian, while the suburbs and surrounding agrarian regions were predominantly Slovenian and Croatian.

Although the division between urban and rural areas across Slovenian lands was not entirely based on ethnicity, the dominant belief at the time was that “[w]hoever came from the countryside was without exception Slovenian-national”. Fran Šuklje, Iz mojih spominov: I. del (Ljubljana: Katoliško tiskovno društvo, 1926), 14. The border regions were hotspots of tension in both urban and rural environments, and these tensions often spilled over into the economic sector. An example illustrating these divisions is a story from the memoirs of Ruda Jurčec, who recalled a large fire at a merchant’s storage – a German-sympathising Slav (so-called Deutschtümler) – in Ormož/Friedau during the final years of Austria-Hungary, where both German and Slovenian fire brigades responded:

Before we delve deeper, it is essential to pause and consider the nature of national identity. The process of nationalisation is complex, influenced by various forces that shape an individual’s identity. Some aspects are chosen freely by the individual; others are shaped by environmental pressures that force a decision. Contemporary research shows that the paths of national identification – which may seem straightforward at first glance – can be complex and lead to ambiguous, variable outcomes. While nationalist struggles were undeniably significant in the Slovenian lands within Austria-Hungary (and beyond), recent scholarship indicates that it is incorrect to assume these divisions were always clearly defined in the sociopolitical sphere. Who constitutes “us” and who are “they” was not always obvious or seamlessly incorporated into everyday situations; instead, national identity was often fluid, and sometimes muddled or contradictory. Janine Schemmer and Klaus Schönberger, “Doing In-Between in the 19th Century in the Alps-Adriatic Region: Everyday Forms and Subjectivation Beyond Nationalising and Ethnicising Subjection,” Traditiones 53, No. 3 (2024): 21–44.

The category of in-between national identity, which could be supranational, non-national, or a hybrid of multiple identities, was universally adopted as a pragmatic strategy for everyday survival. Newspapers and documents available to researchers analysing such questions were most often based on strong positions of particular national and political beliefs; sources reflecting more complex identities are comparatively rare and limited to individual cases. However, unshakeable beliefs should not be attributed to the entire society, which was willing to negotiate its identity to a greater extent. For example, due to indifference, For further information on the role of national indifference in Austria-Hungary and elsewhere, see: Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2006). Tara Zahra, “Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis,” Slavic Review 69, No. 1 (2010): 93–116. Pieter Judson, “Nationalism and Indifference,” in Johannes Feichtinger and Heidemarie Uhl, eds., Habsburg Neu Denken: Vielfalt und Ambivalenz in Zentraleuropa: 30 kulturwissenschaftliche Stichworte (Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2016), 148–55. Pieter Judson, The Habsburg Empire: A New History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). fickleness, and, above all, pragmatism from day to day and even from situation to situation, Gábor Egry, “Beyond Politics: National Indifference as Everyday Ethnicity,” in Maarten Van Ginderachter and Jon Fox, eds., National Indifference and the History of Nationalism in Modern Europe (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2019), 145–60. many Slovenians would present themselves as Germans on a particular occasion, and vice versa. This fluidity, while difficult to conceptualise today, was a widespread occurrence that usually prevailed among peoples who cohabited, except during periods of national tensions and consequent (temporary) polarisation. The economic world operated according to similarly loose and pragmatic laws, except that here the risk was greater and the penalty for mistakes could be harsher, easily affecting the financial and material status of the “delinquent”.

What did all this mean for a typical rural small-scale entrepreneur, merchant or craftsman in the remote Lower Styrian or Carniolan countryside? The majority were far more vulnerable than large-scale national or international companies, so they behaved accordingly – that is, pragmatically, even though their methods could be elusive. There was no simple, universal recipe for staying out of trouble. If one decided to openly promote their firmly established national identity, they risked a boycott by a large part of potential customers. A shop vocally promoting itself as Slovenian, German, Italian, Hungarian, etc., could attract enough nationalist clientele, even if that meant the rest of the shoppers avoided it. However, if it provided poor service, it alienated even its loyal base, which could be a death sentence. Shoppers stopped boycotting the “national enemy’s” shops for many reasons, ranging from poor service and competitors’ lower prices to the “enemy” shop simply being closer to their homes. For an early discussion on these questions, see: “Bojkot in geslo ‘Svoji k svojim!’,” Edinost, 20 September 1908, 1. On the other hand, those merchants who tried not to meddle with national identity and wanted to push it into the background, or simply expressed general indifference to the topic, risked being branded as indecisive and lukewarm when it came to fighting for the national cause. Regardless of the merchants’ personal opinions of themselves, they were easily branded in the public eye as members of one group or another, a label that was very difficult to erase. In practice, perhaps the best results were achieved by those merchants whose national background was well known to the public, neither intentionally obstructed nor loudly promoted, and who offered good service. The quality of service or goods was the best advertisement for any businessman, regardless of their identity.

Although experts confirm that the influence of politics on the economic environment was significant during the period under discussion, it remains difficult to discern the finer details, particularly how people managed this issue in everyday life, where pragmatism should not be underestimated. Unless there was a time of tension requiring everyone to take a clear stance on the national stage, people were not consistently devoted followers of the nationalist ideology; they could and often did behave in a relatively pragmatic manner. The writer and liberal politician Josip Vošnjak described a situation in a small Lower Styrian town in the late 19th century, which he stated “was the same everywhere”, as follows:

Rural merchants and craftsmen had to be cautious to avoid being boycotted for political reasons, but in reality, it is difficult to definitively identify any cases of a rural merchant’s financial collapse or bankruptcy directly caused by such a boycott. This is because sources are both limited and biased, and the reasons for financial failure are often complex and not attributable to a single factor. The article should therefore be regarded as a basis for further research on the topic, rather than a comprehensive or final contribution.

Although the term itself was not in public use before the 1930s, economic nationalism was a widely held philosophy across Austria-Hungary, including the Slovenian lands. Research indicates that “over time[,] market integration became systematically biased: regions with a similar ethno-linguistic composition of the population displayed significantly smaller price gaps between each other than regions with different compositions”; therefore, “intensifying intra-empire nationality conflicts led to severely asymmetric patterns of market integration – economic nationalism mattered”. Max-Stephan Schulze and Nikolaus Wolf, “Economic Nationalism and Economic Integration: The Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Late Nineteenth Century,” Economic History Review 65, No. 2 (2012): 654. Given the ethnically diverse nature of the Habsburg territory, it was relatively easy for national groups to blame one another for their financial losses.

The economic effects of national disputes are evident in many examples among the ethnic groups that made up Austria-Hungary. One of the main divisions was certainly between the two main parts of the empire: Austria and Hungary. In 1906, the latter established the so-called National Tulip Garden Association (Országos Tulipánkert Szövetség), whose members – many of whom were women – promoted Hungarian economic independence and encouraged the purchase of Hungarian goods by organising social events such as fairs, parties, and concerts. Exclusivity also became common at the local level. Jewish entrepreneurs, for example in Croatia, often felt that such initiatives were aimed primarily against them. “Ratno gospodarstvo i Židovi,” Židov, 15 November 1917, 2. When merchants tried to be inclusive, they faced a different kind of problem. At the turn of the century, the press reported on a well-known Viennese mail-order salesman, Emil Storch, who found himself nearly bankrupt; he mainly attributed his difficulties to the need to print his catalogues, posters, and other materials in all 18 languages spoken in the Monarchy, which forced him to drastically scale back and focus only on German-speaking customers. “Oglasil konkurz zaradi jezikovnih razmer v Avstriji,” Soča, 15 May 1900, 3. The opposite scenario could also invite criticism; when, in 1911, chicory producer Norbert Minibek in Vuhred/Wuchern, Lower Styria, went bankrupt, he was criticised in the Slovenian press for using only German on his products. “V Vuhredu,” Slovenski narod, 1 April 1911, 2.

As mentioned, the main method available to a regular customer wishing to express dissatisfaction for any reason was a boycott, described as “a legitimate method of political struggle”. Žarko Lazarević, Plasti prostora in časa: iz gospodarske zgodovine Slovenije prve polovice 20. stoletja (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2009), 314. Any type of establishment could be boycotted: a small merchant, a bank, a cooperative, or a nationwide company. Instead, buyers were encouraged to purchase goods or conduct business only at establishments owned by members of the same ethnic group, thereby strengthening their national and patriotic feelings and fostering national unity, all while supporting the development of the local economy. “The call for a boycott was typically made not offensively but defensively, as a positive, inward-looking motto aimed at maintaining economic ties solely within one’s own national group and purchasing only goods of ‘domestic’ origin.” Rudolf Jaworski, “Zwischen ökonomischer Interessenvertretung und nationalkultureller Selbstbehauptung: Zum Wirtschaftsnationalismus in Ostmitteleuropa vor 1914,” Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung 53 (2004): 266. This economic philosophy evolved into a movement that produced a well-known motto, which can be translated as “Each to Their Own” or “Stick to Your Kind”. The Slovenian version is “Svoji k svojim”, while the German equivalents are “Jeder zu den Seinen”, “Eigene zu Eigenen”, or, for Slovenian lands, “Hie Deutsche, hie Slowenen”. Other versions found in the Habsburg territories include the Czech “Svůj ke svému”, which is very likely the original form adopted by other Slavs, the Polish “Swój do swojego”, and the Croat “Svoj k svome” or “Svoj k svomu”. Ibidem, 265, 266. Božidar Jezernik, “‘Svoji k svojim!’: politične in družbene dimenzije slovenskega narodnega vprašanja,” Etnolog 18, No. 1 (2008): 66-67. Filip Čuček, Svoji k svojim: na poti k dokončni nacionalni razdelitvi na Spodnjem Štajerskem v 19. stoletju (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2016), 8-9, 79, 135. Karel Müller, “Heslo ‘svůj k svému’ v hospodářské emancipaci české společnosti: česká společnost, nacionalismus a národní hospodářství,” Střední Evropa: revue pro středoevropskou kulturu a politiku 89 (1999): 109–23; 90 (1999): 88–104. The phrase was also chosen by the aforementioned Josip Vošnjak as the title of his 1889 comedy play, although he intended it more in a cultural than economic context. Josip Vošnjak, Svoji k svojim: veseloigra v enem dejanji (Ljubljana: Narodna tiskarna, 1889). Other variations also appeared. A milder version of the motto, commonly used among Slovenians, was “Isn’t it nicer to trade among ourselves?”, Dragan Matić, Nemci v Ljubljani 1861–1918 (Ljubljana: Oddelek za zgodovino Filozofske fakultete, 2002), 129. Lazarević, Plasti prostora in časa, 313. while in the Croatian Istrian press, the version “Stick to your kind and everyone will be better off” can be found. “Pozor čitatelji,” Omnibus, 15 October 1907, 1.

Sometimes, a merchant’s strong promotion of their national identity could backfire if they did not provide quality service. For example, some Slovenian merchants exploited nationalist struggles by offering so-called national goods (narodno blago) – products made, distributed, and sold entirely by Slovenians – which were of poor quality. While they relied on the expectation that “their own” would still buy Slovenian goods rather than purchase them from stores owned by supposed national enemies, customers’ pragmatism often prevailed. Public calls emerged to adapt the “Each to their own” motto into a more precise version: “Let the national merchant be the one who has the best national goods, and at the best price!” Janko Sernec, “Železne postave,” Slovenski narod, 21 August 1881, 2. Jezernik, “‘Svoji k svojim!’,” 68-69. Therefore, sticking to buying only from members of the same national group had its limits.

Most researchers agree that the roots of economic nationalist struggles in Slovenian lands date back to the late 1860s, with the mid-1870s marking the first time these efforts became more prominent publicly. Slovenian newspapers reported that Slovenian women in Ljubljana/Laibach/Lubiana were boycotting non-national merchants, opting to buy only from merchants of the same nationality. This initiative was likely motivated by the recent German takeover of the Carniolan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and by alleged manipulations that occurred during the process. The main aim of this and subsequent boycotts was to persuade the opposing side to consider not only economic, but also political and cultural interests of the entire national group. This deeply unsettled the German press, which questioned the emergence of what it described as an allegedly unnatural trait in women’s character. Matić, Nemci v Ljubljani, 129–31. It was during this period that the motto “Each to Their Own” became embedded in the Slovenian press. Before long, it became a common feature in nearly every article on the state of the Slovenian economy, almost serving as a rallying cry. A frequently-quoted passage from the Slovenski narod newspaper states:

From that time onwards, Slovenian newspapers waged an all-out cultural struggle or Kulturkampf against the Germans living in Slovenian territory. They were filled with a particular sentiment that could be described as “economic Schadenfreude”. Whenever a German company, large or small, went bankrupt, the press reported it with undisguised joy, claiming it demonstrated the further decline and moral (as well as financial) decay of their national enemies. Bankrupt German businessmen targeted in this way were explicitly declared enemies of the Slovenians. Understandably, most merchants treated in this manner came from urban centres; a few, however, were more active in (semi-)rural areas. When German or German-supporting Slovenian rural landowners, timber merchants, and others went bankrupt, the Slovenian press rarely failed to mention that the event severely harmed local peasants. For example: “V konkurz,” Slovenec, 10 September 1913, 3.

In Carniola, the rural region that drew the most attention from an economic nationalist perspective was the forested area around the town of Kočevje/Gottschee, where the Gottscheers, a group of medieval German settlers who maintained their Germanic identity, resisted the Slavic and Slovenian political and economic influence, although they remained bilingual and in constant contact with them. For a critical view of the concept of an isolated German linguistic island which has gone unquestioned for decades, see: Anja Moric, “A German ‘linguistic island’ or a linguistically mixed region? Multilingual practices in the Kočevska (Gottschee) area,” Traditiones 50, No. 2 (2021): 123–40. Consequently, on the rare occasion when a Gottscheer faced a setback, the Slovenian press celebrated the event. The Slovenski narod newspaper reported with joy on the bankruptcy of the Kočevje iron merchant Josef Barthelmä, describing him as a “well-known Germanophile and intolerant fanatic” who “drove the Slovenian peasants out of his store, although he could not exist without them at all”. “Konkurz je napovedal v Kočevju,” Slovenski narod, 13 May 1912, 4.

In Lower Styria, the situation was even more difficult than in Carniola due to the more balanced distribution of Slovenians and Germans. From the German perspective, the boycotts by Lower Styrian Slovenians were “of a different, much more tragic nature” than those in Carniola, as this was “where the pan-Slavic movement fought not against powerful German companies, but against small, weak businesses” – that is, small merchants and craftsmen who posed no real threat and whose decline only harmed the local economies as a whole. Karl Linhart, Der Abwehrkrieg des unterländischen Deutschtums (Pettau: Deutscher Verein, 1910), 52. The Slovenian press, however, was very explicit in its demands:

Slovenian newspapers in Lower Styria frequently criticised Slovenian buyers for being excessively submissive to German merchants. One such example was a certain Steinklauber, owner of a brick factory in Pragersko/Pragerhof, who also established a local German school attended by Slovenian children. This was seen as a blatant attempt at Germanising young Slovenians by a hypocritical businessman who had become wealthy through Slovenian capital but was politically antagonistic towards Slovenians. “Iz Slov. Bistrice,” Domovina, 7 June 1907, 4.

Another Lower Styrian example was the Laško/Tüffer brewer Julius Larisch – according to the Slovenian press, “the leader of the party opposing us in Laško, the founder of the local group of the German Schulverein [School society] there, and an opponent of the Slovenians in everything”. When he went bankrupt in 1885, the Slovenski narod newspaper did not fail to note that “his friends in Laško will be pretty badly affected by his economic demise”. “V Laškem trgu,” Slovenski narod, 28 August 1885, 3. Larisch’s bankrupt brewery was acquired by the Žalec/Sachsenfeld brewer Simon Kukec, who, to the delight of Slovenians, transformed it into a local pillar of Slovenian national identity. Edo Jelovšek, “Zgodovina pivovarništva v Laškem,” in Jože Maček, ed., Laški zbornik 2002 (Laško: Knjižnica, 2002), 214–16.

Similar patterns can be observed in Carinthia. The most notable example from the region is landowner and factory owner Martin Pleschiutschnigg from near Slovenj Gradec/Windischgrätz, who owned extensive estates and was described by the Slovenian press as “our national opponent and an ‘excellent’ supporter of the German-Liberal Party”. When he went bankrupt in 1895 due to the collapse of a Klagenfurt/Celovec merchant to whom he had lent money, it was reported that he escaped to Germany. “Konkurz,” Slovenec, 30 April 1895, 4. The Klagenfurt Slovenian newspaper Mir noted: “Martin Plešivčnik, a large landowner below Uršlja Mountain, a supporter of the German Liberal Party, disappeared. He left extensive debts; his liberal creditors are now scratching their heads.” “Na Štajerskem,” Mir, 10 May 1895, 61. A subsequent account (from the socialist Yugoslav period) suggests that Pleschiutschnigg was far from popular among the Slovenian peasantry in Carinthia; he was described as a heartless plunderer of the Carinthian forests who enjoyed flaunting his wealth, until it all collapsed due to excessive spending. This version claims he fled to the United States and eventually ended up with his son in Tarvisio/Trbiž/Tarvis and finally in Graz/Gradec, where he died in obscurity. His estates were mostly purchased by an enigmatic Italian figure, Marquis Dominique Pandolfi, Prince de Guttadauro, who was apparently also unsuccessful in managing them, as he went broke in just three years. “Aus Windisch-Graz,” Deutsche Wacht, 10 October 1895, 4. Fr. Sušnik, “Naša gora,” Koroški fužinar, 27 August 1952, 2. The Slovenian press suggested that Pleschiutschnigg’s surname was a Germanised version of Plešivčnik, and some earlier reports indeed used that version and spoke highly of him, praising him as a successful Carinthian businessman. “Iz Celovca 22. julija,” Slovenski narod, 23 July 1886, 3. With his changed identity, he went from being celebrated to people rejoicing in his downfall.

Is it possible to argue that economic nationalism contributed to the downfall of Pleschiutschnigg and others? The absence of accessible data prevents us from definitive conclusions. However, it is clear that ethnicity played a significant role in the Slovenian press when reporting on the failures and bankruptcies of German or German-sympathising businessmen. Yet, the “economic Schadenfreude” in such reports was certainly not exclusive to the Slovenian press.

The German community went along with it. The German-sympathising newspapers from Carniola and Lower Styria, especially Deutsche Wacht and Štajerc (published in Slovenian and aimed at attracting the Lower Styrian countryside away from Slovenian national struggles towards cooperation with German peasants, craftsmen and merchants), Šuligoj, “Ptuj – ‘nemška trdnjava’,” 20-21. Kristina Šamperl – Purg, “Septembrski dogodki v luči časopisa Štajerc in nekaj izhodišč za opredelitev leta 1908 kot prelomnega v slovenski zgodovini,” in Bojan Terbuc, ed., Septembrski dogodki 1908: zbornik (Ptuj: Zgodovinsko društvo, 1998), 69–79. were filled with cynical reports and commentaries mocking the Slovenian economic situation and reassuring readers that the German economy remained as strong as ever. “Isn’t it amusing,” Deutsche Wacht wrote, “when Pervaks [Slovenian political leaders] who display the slogan ‘Each to their own’ on their banners, get upset about alleged defamation and want to parade around with a crippled sense of justice? Comedians!” “Die ‘Domovina’,” Deutsche Wacht, 14 August 1904, 3. However, there were also many complaints about the unfairness of Slovenian boycotts, describing them as a ruthless, fanatical “holy war” full of blind nationalist rage and outright lies, such as widespread claims that Slovenian peasants were being beaten by German merchants. What the Lower Styrian Slovenians perceived as German control of the largest cities and therefore the entire region, the local Germans viewed as pockets of German urban influence surrounded by a threatening ocean of Slovenian rural enemies. Karl Linhart, Der Abwehrkrieg des unterländiscen Deutschtums (Pettau: Deutscher Verein, 1910), 52-53. What particularly offended rural Germans was the Slovenian view that their ancestors had encroached on this land and were living off Slovenian bread. Since Maribor, Ptuj, and Celje relied on their rural surroundings, the complaint that “the peaceful Slovenian rural population is being incited against the German working classes to a ruthless national boycott” “Die neueste Blüthe des wirtschaftlichen Kampfes der slovenischer Volksverhetzer,” Deutsche Wacht, 28 January 1900, 1-2. was common in the German press. This is why the German community strongly supported criminalising incitement to business boycotts, as this could prevent “the mischief of the Slovenian hate press, which aims to starve German merchants and business owners”. “Ein neues Pressgesetz,” Deutsche Wacht, 15 June 1902, 2.

The methods employed by the Germans to counter Slovenian economic pressure were quite broad. To start with, since the late 19th century, they published semi-secret brochures – guides to German-loyal companies meant to help German buyers choose suitable businesses from Carniola, Lower Styria, Carinthia, and other regions. “Opozarjamo,” Domovina, 6 July 1908, 2. “Kdo je začel z bojkotom?,” Notranjec, 2 January 1909, 5. During times of strained relations, it was apparently common for German entrepreneurs to dismiss some or all of their Slovenian workers or to prohibit them from using Slovenian-owned shops and inns, even though most of their profits came from Slovenians themselves. “Celjski izgredi,” Slovenec, 19 August 1899, 5. “Boj nemških trgovcev proti slovenskim trg. pomočnikom,” Slovenec, 14 November 1903, 4. It should be noted that these claims were mainly published in the Slovenian press in a defamatory manner, so the true scale of this phenomenon remains uncertain. Another innovative German tactic was propaganda through simple poems. Just before World War I, the Slovenian press was disturbed by the following German verses, inspired by nursery rhymes designed to teach children about Christian values:

Slovenian dissatisfaction with double standards was palpable. In their view, the poem attested “to the intensity and consistency with which the Germans wage their economic struggle against the Slavs”, while also demonstrating how unrestricted the German press freedom was: “Among the Slavs, even the slightest hint at economic matters is impossible […], while the Germans are allowed to unabashedly announce the boycott of the Slavs in prose and verse”. Ibid.

Perhaps the most effective German measure took place in 1889. As Deutsche Wacht stated:

Südmark was a German nationalist society aimed, according to its supporters, at assisting endangered Germans living in ethnically mixed regions of Austria-Hungary (such as Lower Styria) by providing economic and financial support to peasants and artisans and by purchasing rural land to settle new German colonists. Šuligoj, “Ptuj – ‘nemška trdnjava’,” 22. As such, it directly challenged Slovenian rural economic interests and was often subjected to heavy criticism or mockery by the Slovenian press. “This association,” the reports claimed, “is nothing more than a union of Germans and Deutschtümler Slovenians, which boycotts Slovenians […] and endeavours to completely collapse our nation.” Thus, it has become “a legitimised means of boycotting Slovenians, standing in the service of the Great German thought”. “Utrinki iz naše kranjske politike,” Slovenski list, 14 May 1898, 1. Slovenian reports about bankrupt Germans who were also members of Südmark were thus especially cynical and mocking. One such example was the case of the innkeeper and landowner Jakob Novak from Lovrenc na Pohorju/Sankt Lorenzen am Bachern, who was criticised as a supporter of the Grossdeutscher whose inn was a meeting place for the Germans and Deutschtümler. The fact that he had to spend a week in prison for fraudulent bankruptcy in 1913 was particularly highlighted. “Zopet eden,” Slovenec, 9 October 1913, 3.

The most significant turning point in the polarised Slovenian-German relations was the events of 1908. The situation grew increasingly tense throughout the year, and references to a Slovenian boycott were already emerging in the summer. In the Littoral region, Italian merchants became unwelcome at local fairs, “‘Svoji k svojim’ na Goriškem,” Naš list, 27 June 1908, 4. and the same was happening in Lower Styria, as a declaration by the Sokol gymnastics society illustrates: “On 15–16 August, there will be a large Sokol celebration in Ljutomer/Luttenberg. In addition to Slovenian innkeepers, a few German ones also wish to attend. We will only support those who have decorated their tents with [Slovenian] tricolours and boycott all others.” “Iz Ljutomera,” Narodni list, 23 July 1908, 3. In September (hence the name “the September events”), an assembly of the Slovenian national defence organisation Cyril-Methodius Society was held in Ptuj, which was traditionally regarded as a German city, so the local Germans perceived it as an obvious provocation. As a result, a group of German demonstrators disrupted the event. This caused an uproar among Slovenians and led to widespread demonstrations. Matters escalated on 20 September in Ljubljana, where the army fired on a group of Slovenian protesters, killing two: Ivan Adamič and Rudolf Lunder. They immediately became Slovenian martyrs and symbols of the deeply felt anti-German sentiment. While the events also sparked German demonstrations across Austria-Hungary, including in Klagenfurt, where the provincial government ordered the physical protection of Slovenian buildings, the Slovenians collectively regarded the Germans as responsible for the events. The political crisis spilled over into the economic sphere. First, Slovenians demanded, and sometimes carried out, the removal of German inscriptions from shops in Ljubljana. Then, they used their primary weapon against the German economy: a boycott. The main institution targeted by Slovenian anger was the Carniolan Savings Bank in Ljubljana, regarded as the backbone and principal financier of the German economy throughout the duchy. A bank run was organised to deplete the savings bank’s funds and render it insolvent, but the effort only made a dent in its financial stability. For at least a few weeks, enthusiasm for the widespread boycott was high, but soon news of Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina became the new focus. Matić, Nemci v Ljubljani, 345–54. Branko Goropevšek, “Kaj takega je mogoče pri nas v Avstriji sedaj v 20. stoletju? Odmev in pomen septembrskih dogodkov leta 1908,” in Bojan Terbuc, ed., Septembrski dogodki 1908: zbornik (Ptuj: Zgodovinsko društvo, 1998), 47–61. Nataša Henig Miščič, “Carniolan Savings Bank and Slovenian-German relations in 1908 and 1909,” Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino 60, No. 1 (2020): 47–70.

As mentioned, we can only discuss large-scale boycotts during periods of national tension, when a struggle for the national cause replaces everyday pragmatism. The year 1908 was the most notable example in Slovenian territory before World War I, although it should be noted that even on that occasion, the Slovenian political camp was not united. The boycott was primarily a liberal initiative, promoted in the liberal newspaper Slovenski narod, as conservatives and social democrats regarded it as either illegal or too risky due to its potential to destabilise the economy or as an attempt by the liberal bourgeoisie to profit from boycotting German institutions. Božidar Jezernik, Mesto brez spomina: javni spomeniki v Ljubljani (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2014), 292–94.

After the burst of spontaneous reactions, a question arose among the Slovenian public that initially seemed to have an obvious answer, at least before it was examined in detail: which companies are genuinely Slovenian, and which are German? Which of them should be boycotted? Slovenski narod elaborated in a short essay: “A somewhat peculiar question at first glance, because one might assume it would not be difficult […] to distinguish a Slovenian from a non-Slovenian. However, through our long-standing indifference and hastily satisfied national indulgence, it has developed to the point where it is now common to regard a very colourful company as Slovenian.” The newspaper suggested that wealthy and influential patrons had established many friendly business contacts and a complex network of protections. At the same time, many important details – such as “whether the merchant employs Slovenian workers in his shop, whether his relatives speak Slovenian, whether there is a Slovenian spirit among his relatives, whether the children are brought up in the Slovenian spirit, and whether he directly or indirectly supports German organisations by providing them with money” – were not discussed. The new requirement for who a Slovenian businessman should be, the newspaper claimed, was anyone who not only had Slovenian roots and political convictions but also clearly demonstrated, through their public acts and financial support, that they were an adherent of Slovenian institutions, from schools to humanitarian societies. Sl., “Razbistrimo pojme!,” Slovenski narod, 17 October 1908, 3.

Despite philosophical debates, the Slovenian public paid little attention to the details in everyday life. Boycotts and occasional assaults on German-owned shops spread beyond urban centres, incited by fiery articles in Slovenian newspapers, lists of recommended Slovenian stores, and forbidden Germanophile outlets, along with new slogans accompanying “Each to their own”, such as “When paying a krone or a heller, always say: I remember Ptuj” and “Slovenian men and women should only buy from Slovenians”. Goropevšek, “Kaj takega,” 59. Articles revived old stories about German settlers living lavishly off the labour of impoverished Slovenian peasants and showing not even a shred of gratitude. Timid Slovenians, the newspapers argued, had accepted the situation and continued to support German businesses with their money – but after the September events, this had to end immediately, and they should instead support only their compatriots, even if the lower prices of German merchants seemed tempting. “Nemška hvaležnost in slovenska nezavednost,” Slovenski narod, 16 May 1908, 1. “Kranjskih Nemcev gospodarska vojska zoper kranjske Slovence,” Slovenski narod, 20 July 1908, 2. “Nemci bojkotirajo slovenske trgovce,” Slovenski narod, 28 September 1908, 2.

Slovenian politicians from the liberal spectrum immediately became actively involved in the events. The representatives of the National Party for Styria (Narodna stranka za Štajersko), a Slovenian liberal party, stated at their November 1908 meeting:

By late October, the Slovenian Lower Styrian press reported that the boycott’s effects were already affecting local German merchants, as widespread fear of bankruptcy had arisen among them, “Bojkot nemških trgovcev in obrtnikov,” Domovina, 26 October 1908, 2. except for the few that had not participated in the Ptuj attacks. While those merchants faced ostracism from other Germans, Slovenians began to frequent their shops. “Nemški bojkot,” Slovenec, 29 October 1908, 3. Reports mentioned letters written by German merchants, pleading with Slovenian peasants to return to their shops and promoting low prices and the quality of their goods. “Nemškim trgovcem,” Slovenski gospodar, 5 November 1908, 4. However, the rural population remained steadfast and was praised as the group demonstrating extraordinary self-sacrifice, while the urban, wealthier Slovenians were criticised for their lukewarm support of the boycott. “Nemške trgovine v Ptuju,” Edinost, 14 November 1908, 4. “Resen opomin celjskim Slovencem in Slovenkam!,” Narodni list, 19 November 1908, 2. “Zavednost okoliških Slovencev okrog Ptuja,” Narodni list, 19 November 1908, 4. “Svoji k svojim,” Jutro, 10 April 1910, 2. Additionally, rural Slovenians started to produce “memorial cards”, which were given to every German travelling salesman:

At the same time, the Slovenian press argued that the Germans were spreading false propaganda, claiming that the boycott of German merchants was hurting Slovenian peasants because no Germans wanted to buy Slovenian goods any longer. The Slovenian press called this a blatant lie, citing a story about a group of German buyers from Graz who arrived to purchase wine from a Slovenian winery near Ormož and, while waiting, began shooting their pistols for fun. When asked about the meaning of this behaviour, they explained that they had armed themselves because the German press had warned them against the Slavic savages, but after seeing that they were among good people, they could use their bullets for target practice. “Nemškutarji – gospodarski škodljivci našega kmeta!,” Narodni list, 12 November 1908, 4.

Understandably, the Carniolan and Styrian Germans perceived the situation quite differently. Since Štajerc, which extensively covered the Ptuj events and their repercussions, was meant for Slovenian rural readers, it made clear that the peasants were not responsible for the attacks taking place in the countryside; after all, diligent farmers had their fields and cattle to care for and did not involve themselves in political conflicts. “Ne igrajte se z ognjem!,” Štajerc, 18 October 1908, 2. The real economic interest for a Slovenian peasant, the newspaper emphasised, was not the Slovenian journalist who wrote scathing anti-German articles, but a cultivated German from urban centres. “What would happen, for example, if Germans did not want to buy Styrian wines, cattle, fruit, and so on?”, Štajerc asked. “Bojkot,” Štajerc, 20 September 1908, 2. Karl Linhart, ed.,‘Štajerčevi’ kmetski koledar za leto 1911 (Ptuj: ‘Štajerčevo’ tiskovno društvo, 1911), 87–90. “Each to their own” was declared to be the motto of those who sought to exploit the peasantry under the pretext of national struggle and to sell their poor-quality goods. “Svoji k svojim!,” Štajerc, 4 October 1908, 1.

The Slovenian boycott movement, which was compared to Orientalist fanaticism in the German press, “Deutsche Abwehr,” Deutsche Wacht, 24 October 1908, 1. was declared not only technically illegal under Austrian criminal law “Bojkot kazniv!,” Štajerc, 31 January 1909, 3. but was also perceived as an arrow pointing at the archer. “Deutsche Abwehr,” Deutsche Wacht, 30 September 1908, 1–2. The German community was convinced that Slovenians could not survive without them. The logic was simple: if bankrupting German merchants were economically feasible for Slovenians, they would have done so long ago, but they understood that doing so would mean the end of the Slovenian-based economy “Slovenische Boycott-Drohungen,” Deutsche Wacht, 19 September 1908, 4. (this is why the press mocked the German-language poster advertising Postojna/Adelsberg Cave, which had not been removed, implying that wealthy German visitors were still welcome). “Deutsche Reklame für Adelsberg,” Deutsche Wacht, 14 October 1908, 6. Nevertheless, indignation still persisted. The German community was offended by the tone of reports in the Slovenian press, especially in Slovenski narod, which described them as “outrageously brutal, unspeakably mean, full of envy and malice, and filled with lies and slander”. “Die Boykotthetze,” Deutsche Wacht, 23 December 1908, 5. Another contentious issue was the participation of many (mostly female) servants, apprentices, assistants, and factory workers employed by German employers and companies in anti-German demonstrations, which was seen as disloyalty to the hand that fed them, “Wie du mir, so ich dir!,” Deutsche Wacht, 19 September 1908, 3. as was the treatment their compatriots received in rural areas. In Carniola, the press claimed, many bilingual inscriptions were removed, destroyed, or smeared; travelling salesmen were harassed; German stores were monitored and their customers intimidated; and at times, German merchants were expelled from towns (in Kranjska Gora/Kronau, this was apparently done by the mayor himself). Matić, Nemci v Ljubljani, 350-51.

The German responses to the boycott were quite varied. Some Germans from Slovenian towns prepared documents written in Slovenian for the rural population, aiming to appease rural Slovenians and highlight the slander and libel spread by the Slovenian press, which incited unnecessary hatred and violence. Ibid., 351. To strengthen the German economic position, Germans from other parts of Austria-Hungary were encouraged to do business with German and loyalist Slovenian merchants in Lower Styria, especially in rural areas, by purchasing wine, fruit, and crops, “Proti slovenskemu bojkotu nemških trgovcev,” Slovenec, 24 November 1908, 6. and by limiting the influx of Slovenian sellers into regions with a German majority, such as Klagenfurt. “Nemški meščani,” Slovenski gospodar, 8 October 1908, 3. More specific measures at the individual level included evicting Slovenian tenants from German-owned buildings “Nemški bojkot v Ptuju – na vidiku?,” Narodni list, 17 September 1908, 2, 3. or preventing them from settling there in the first place, “Nemški bojkot,” Straža, 29 August 1910, 3. as well as forming an anti-boycott movement, which involved boycotting shops that publicly promoted the “Each to their own” motto, sometimes with posters. “Svoji k svojim – Grenadierwirt und Pletersky,” Deutsche Wacht, 31 October 1908, 4. The new slogan became: “Boycott those who are boycotting!” “Kdo je kriv?,” Štajerc, 15 November 1908, 1.

The extent of the boycott’s damage to German merchants and craftsmen remains unknown and was never measured. However, news reports suggest that some bankruptcies resulted directly from the boycott, especially due to the actions of the peasantry: “The Mattheis store in Brežice/Rann is up for sale. Yes, indeed: our peasantry is waking up; therefore, it is necessary to secure the profits of their hardships in time.” “Trgovina Mattheis,” Slovenski gospodar, 5 November 1908, 5. “Trgovina Mattheis v Brežicah,” Domovina, 6 November 1908, 2. The bankrupt German merchants from Lower Styria continued to use the Slovenian boycott as an excuse for their financial downfall for quite some time after the September events, as late as 1911. “V konkurz,” Narodni list, 21 January 1909, 3. “Iz Ptuja,” Slovenski narod, 30 January 1911, 2.

Economic nationalism, though not known by that name, was apparent in both urban and rural regions of Austria-Hungary. In daily life, people acted pragmatically and paid little attention to the national affiliations of merchants, craftsmen, and others from whom they purchased goods and services. However, during periods of nationalist unrest and increased tensions, such distinctions became much more marked and divisive. This trend can be traced in the Slovenian territory from the 1860s, but most notably in 1908. The main tactic at that time was to boycott shops, goods, and services perceived as hostile to Slovenians. The true extent of the boycott is difficult to determine, as most evidence is anecdotal and from sources with a nationalist bias. Nonetheless, it is clear that, after a few months or at most a year, pragmatism once again took precedence. Principles, it appears, have an expiration date.

The 1908 affair, like other similar Austro-Hungarian examples, shows that “boycotts only had a chance of temporary success in manageable and therefore socially controllable small-town environments”, which was even harder to achieve in the countryside, where a lack of public space and centralised coordinated action made systematic initiatives difficult to implement. Jaworski, “Zwischen ökonomischer,” 267. Even though those who initiated a boycott might not admit it, in many cases, the boycotted merchants were a vital part of the local economies; their disappearance would cause significant, if not irreplaceable, damage.

However, the real scope of a boycott and its financial impact – information that is certainly not very clear for the Slovenian rural environment – may not be the most important measure. The symbolic effects of constant calls for a boycott, and thus effective national differentiation and a display of national solidarity, were noticeable and visible. For a time, the prevailing emotions helped national factions consolidate and form identities for those in between. Ibid., 267-68. Lazarević, Plasti prostora in časa, 314. That may be the true goal behind such initiatives; while it was clear that a boycott would never be so consistent or prolonged as to bring an entire ethnic group to its knees, it was a useful tool to strengthen national battle lines in both urban and rural areas.

The research was conducted as part of the research programme No. P6-0280 Economic, social and environmental history of Slovenia, funded by the Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency (ARIS) from the state budget.