1V prispevku avtor opozarja na negativne plati družbenega, političnega in gospodarskega razvoja v Republiki Sloveniji po njeni osamosvojitvi. Izstopa t. i. divja privatizacija nekdanjega družbenega in državnega premoženja, ki so ji bili vodilo nepošteni nameni, okoriščanje in pohlep, pri čemer je manjši del prebivalstva zelo obogatel. Za to nosita velik del odgovornosti pravni sistem in politika, ki nista pripravila ustreznih zakonov. Politika ne uživa zaupanja, ki je temelj demokracije. V družbi se je uveljavil narcistični tip človeka, ki želi čim bolj poskrbeti zase in pri tem odrivati druge, »šefovske etaže« v podjetjih pa neusmiljeno pobijajo socialni čut. Družbo pretresajo hudi ideološki spori in preprečujejo nacionalno soglasje o etičnem temelju slovenske države in smotrom njenega obstoja. Tiste, ki so ob osamosvojitvi s polnimi pljuči zadihali narodno čustvo in pričakovali zgodovinski dvig slovenstva, je tak razvoj razočaral. Zgodovinopisje in psihiatrija sta o omenjeni problematiki v zadnjih letih opravila več kvalitetnih, tudi monografskih, obravnav.
2Ključne besede: osamosvojitev, privatizacija, politika, ideološkost, narcistična družba, zgodovinopisje, psihiatrija
1In his paper, the author points out the negative aspects of the social, political and economic development in the Republic of Slovenia, following its independence. What stands out is the uncontrolled privatisation of former public and state property, which was rooted in dishonest intentions, profiteering and greed, and resulted in a small part of the population becoming very rich. The legal system and the politics are largely to blame for the situation, as they failed to prepare suitable laws that would prevent it from happening. Trust, the very foundation of democracy, is not something that would currently be associated with the politicians. The society has witnessed the rise of narcissistic characters who only care for their own well-being and who trample over others, while the companies' executives are doing their best to eradicate any social concern. Society is being shaken by severe ideological conflicts, which prevent a national consensus on the ethical foundation of the Slovenian state and the purpose of its existence. Those who fully embraced the national sentiment and expected a historic rise of Slovenianism when Slovenia became independent were disappointed by such development of events. In recent years, historiography and psychiatry have been examining the issue in a number of publications, including monographs.
2Key words: independence, privatisation, politics, ideology, narcissistic society, historiography, psychiatry
1It was already evening on 15th January 1992, when I was walking along Vegova Street, headed for the Institute of Contemporary History in Ljubljana, after spending the day reviewing historical materials at the National and University Library. I first heard and then saw an exemplar meandering in the middle of the street, crying out: “Slovenia, I love you so! I would give half of my life for you!” – “As would I, as would I!” it crossed my mind, but I derailed the train of thought. My profession as a historian prevented me from giving into the intoxicating sensation brought about by the fact that, on that day, Slovenia was internationally recognised by the states of the European Community. I subsequently recalled this event on several occasions and tried to assess the unfinished thought of that day.
2I witnessed the “offering” on Vegova Street after spending time with the Slovenians who lived in the first Yugoslav state. Therefore, it makes sense that, while making a list of the years of Slovenian independence, which fulfilled the promise of a "success story" for a while, I was faced with the question of what Slovenians revealed about themselves after leaving multinational states in which they ultimately saw their national and democratic demise. Given our historical position after 1991, the question is even more engaging, since we are not ruled neither by Vienna or Belgrade, nor by any single-party political system. We do, however, feel the influence of Brussels and the Euro-Atlantic powers.
3After turning from the Austrian south to the Yugoslav north in 1918, the Slovenians expected to find themselves in the "promised land". They had dreamt and written about it before the above-mentioned change.1 But the reality was somewhat different. Autonomy was not attained, the nations were constitutionally wiped out and merged into a Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian nationality, the same name was given to the official language, there were no more Slovenian regiments (a Slovenian military force was, however, formed in the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in November 1918), and Slovenian soldiers were dispersed across the entire Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, i.e. Yugoslavia. The belief that the toxic battles fought among political parties were at their end, which was expressed by a liberal politician Albert Kramer in his address to the leader of the Catholic Vseslovenska ljudska stranka (Pan-Slovenian People's Party) Dr Anton Korošec, when he visited Ljubljana on 23 and 24 March 1918,2 did not come true. Almost 20 years later, the Maribor-based newspaper Neodvisnost revealed that
"Slovenians no longer consider themselves as a unit but as a mixture of different tribes without any sense of community, who are engaged in a fierce, insensitive and brutal fight against extermination. These tribes include the clericals, liberals, Marxists, and others, whatever they may be called. The fire of passion and hatred is stoked by the media which is daily poisoning our society. No supreme and unalterable national principles, no clear and firm objectives can therefore be found in it and in our public."3
4There were still Carniolan and Styrian people to be found, even though Ivan Hribar, in October 1918, expected that the people of Slovenia would “all (…) simply be Slovenians”.4 There was, however, cultural and economical progress but the Sava river flowed “downstream”, which was “patriotic” as written by the very young Mitja Ribičič in 1927.5 Comfort was sought in the notion of the Slovenian people being hard-working, honest, reliable, kind-hearted and generally non-problematic, i.e. in the attributes which supposedly illustrated the truth of their civilisational image. We should not forget to mention the political parties, organisations and associations, which multiplied across the Slovenian territory. Those with federalist inclinations tended to mention the North American countries and Switzerland as national models to be emulated.
5Historiography clarified the above issues rather well, while the contemporaries of the first 22-year-Yugoslav period managed to prepare two extensive, comprehensive presentations of the then Slovenian development This shows the extent of their interest in the subject matter. The collections entitled Slovenci v desetletju 1918–1928 (Slovenians in the decade 1918–1928) (1928) and Spominski zbornik Slovenije : ob dvajsetletnici Kraljevine Jugoslavije (Memorial booklet of Slovenia : the twentieth anniversary of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) (1939) are still considered to be two definitive works of academic literature.
6And our twenty-five years? Slovenians have taken up an international legal position – the Republic of Slovenia. The Slovenian language retained its official nature from the second Yugoslavia; once again, the Slovenians got their own army and witnessed several remarkable cultural and sports-related successes at home and abroad; the media developed further, and, as for the economy, we will mention that later; however, Sava river does not necessarily seem to flow downstream when it leaves the Slovenian territory any more. Slovenians were taking leave as the “objects of history who caught a cold.”6 Tomaž Šalamun, who coined this description, repeated it in his speech marking the Slovenian cultural holiday – the Prešeren Day, in 2000. He described Slovenia as a
“beautiful, relatively rich, lively and creative country. The people are friendlier, the changes are profound, the language is fresh and stimulating (...). The wonder of a civilising momentum is happening here with great force. We are actualised to such a degree that we will hopefully no longer yearn for the watchful eyes of protective big brothers, and we will maintain our sovereignty and democracy. The wisdom of the people can also be seen in them refusing to follow its elites if they stray, but simply relieving them of their duty.”7
7What was created was “a flawed paradise”8 The ideological “tribes” remained, using new tools being, along with the old ones – the experiences of the second world conflict and of the attainment of independence as well as of the previous society, which was saturated with “organisation, politics, matter, ideology, and everything of importance in the world, it was the World.” This is how Taras Kermauner perceived the then society.9 While some fully embraced the national sentiment and expected the historic rise of Slovenianism and its ethical acknowledgement and “everyone was invited to participate” – as Šalamun described it,10 the new Slovenian world witnessed the open season – a hunting season for predators engaging in privatisation, accumulation of weapons, ruthless politics and the like. The aptness of circuses without bread, i.e. either political or ideological wars, including what was practically an online civil war, was never under question. What is more, the lack of cognitive powers and a greater focus on money, adrenaline and human indifference, as opposed to the spirit, attest to such significant decline in values. Slovenians failed to become "moral juggernauts", as the nation's fulfilment was envisaged by Edvard Kocbek.11 Intolerance and aggression prevailed, Slovenians did not succeed in morally withstanding the civilising momentum. These two topics were best dealt with by one of the leading Slovenian experts in the field of psychoanalysis, Dr Matjaž Lunaček, and an observer of Slovenians, the academic named Niko Grafenauer. When asked about which type of personality is the most characteristic for the Slovenian society at this moment, Lunaček replied:
“Most definitely the narcissistic one since the social environment enables or even demands to develop a personality of such type. Everybody endeavours to take care of themselves by pushing others away. Due to the increasing workload we can, to some extent, talk about obsessiveness.”
8The generation who grew up in a system that slowly slipped into today's situation lacks ethical and moral norms. “Inculpability and impertinence are the biggest mischiefs in our society.” Besides that, the politicians are completely ignorant of the real situation in the country. Just like the clergy, the politicians should visit a psychoanalyst to
“develop an awareness of their deeds. Being in touch with reality is, in fact, an aspect that is developed only to a limited extent in a narcissistic population. Compared to other professions of special significance, politicians mainly possess a combination of ambitiousness and a steep career upward trajectory. The situation of this kind is anything but stable. However, it is a marvellous opportunity for the functioning of narcissists.”
9However, the employers who encouraged the crisis of values, also took advantage of this. If we take history into consideration,
"we find that worker's rights increased due to huge efforts and extensive sacrifices. But then neoliberalism came and brought with it the possibility to exploit the workers to a great extent. Employers do not feel any moral obligation towards their employees with there being such vast amounts of unemployed people. It is a regressive process and a torpedoing of society and of a state in which employers try to establish their own order. Countries with tradition are able to fight this, while Slovenia is merely letting it all happen freely. Despite legal standards that regulate the attitude of employers towards employees, there have always been options to circumvent the law."12
10This enables “the ruling caste” to ruthlessly suppress social sense and silence the employees' voices, while mobbing casts its victims into social isolation; in it, they fall into a complex state of anxiety, depression and addiction that prevents them from functioning normally, resulting in a substantial diminution of the quality of their lives.13 Even though there are legal instruments which exist to protect employees from mobbing in the EU and Slovenia,14 only a few have the courage to resort to these laws.
11Niko Grafenauer shared a similar point of view a while ago, believing that the suicide in Slovenia now exists only in one comprehensive form. The reason for this situation cannot be attributed to anyone other than us. We are what we are – quarrellers, clique members, thieves, cynics, show-offs etc. In short, we are provincials without any vision and without any sense of civic self-responsibility. “It does not matter what others do to us,” once said Dušan Pirjevec, “but it is important what we do to ourselves.”15 Obviously, the consolation from the first (and also the second) Yugoslavia does no longer apply. The same goes for comparisons with other nations, as we are only responsible for ourselves. We need to take a look in the mirror. And Hribar’s soul, intertwined with celestial global dynamics, as he wrote in his farewell letter on 18 April 1941,16 still awaits the Slovenians (which is probably why those who hear this national signifier when travelling around the world don not seem to want to acknowledge each other). However in an interview for Misteriji magazine, a pamphlet on the verge of medicine and other sciences, conducted in May 2014, Slovenian ambassador Bojan Grobovšek talks about his book entitled Zakaj Slovenija ni Švica (Why Slovenia is not Switzerland), in which he speaks in favour of rendering the Slovenian language as half as important in terms of being the official language. According to Grobovšek, "it would probably be extremely good for Slovenia to introduce another official language – English, to be exact – next to Slovenian."17 Less than three weeks after the 25th anniversary of independence, on 15 July 2016 – after the first reading of the Act amending the Higher Education Act as proposed by the Slovenian government, the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopted the amendment of the aforementioned law with 46 votes for and 15 against. The adoption of the amendment permits teaching in foreign languages, namely English, at Slovenian universities. For now, this amendment serves as a legal basis for neglecting Slovenian in tertiary education. This might even result in a paradoxical situation in which lectures by Slovenian professors for Slovenian students at Slovenian universities would be held in English. The reason for this subservient linguistic suicide is not rooted abroad but in those Slovenian university circles who consider Slovenian as less appealing in terms of business. “Reading room exaltation” cannot be a form of resistance to this phenomenon, according to the opinion expressed in a parliamentary discussion on 15 July by Saša Tabaković, a member of the Stranka modernega centra political party.18 If the amendments of the proposed bill are adopted in the aforementioned law, we can illustrate Dr Boris A. Novak's opinion on the position of the culture expressed fifteen years ago by declaring that the Slovenian language is exposed to a threat by the state itself.19 At the round table entitled “Zagovor slovenščine (Defending Slovenian language)” held on 13 July 2016 at Slovenska matica in Ljubljana, Boris A. Novak, a poet, essayist, stage director, lecturer at the Department of Comparative Literature and Literary Theory at the Faculty of Arts Ljubljana, Slovenian, cosmopolitan, guest lecturer at American universities, and translator of more than ten languages, including from Slovenian to English and back, expressed his disapproval towards Anglicising changes and amendments in the Act Amending the Higher Education Act.20 Fifteen years ago he said:
“No foreigner and no other culture are more harmful to Slovenian culture than Slovenians themselves. If politics becomes cynical, only praises consumerism and treats culture (and language – note by J. P.) with ignorance, then our future is looking bleak. I believe we are bad at opening up to and shutting off from others. Instead of being open to new things when needed, our attitude resembles the one of a provincial introvert. And then whenever there is an opportunity for us to protect our cultural identity dauntlessly, we are willing to trade it in for a small amount of money. This petty tradesman mentality could cost us a fortune."21
12We must mention Anton Korošec's words from 13 March 1923 about Slovenian unwillingness to drown in the seas of Serbo-Croatian culture (currently English culture): “Who could blame us?”22 – At this point we should emphasise that, in reality, Slovenians should protect the Slovenian language even more, since less and less people are able to express themselves verbally or in written form in proper Slovenian, not to mention the universal disrespect of intellectual work.
13A historian and politician, Dr Drago Lončar wrote, in his renowned work Politično življenje Slovencev (The Political Life of Slovenians) which was published in 1921, about how Slovenians "managed to escape the yoke of foreign subordination. Now the history has given the Slovenians a mission to prove that they are capable of the greatest human art form: to govern themselves."23 At that time, the otherwise down-to-earth Lončar exaggerated as he wrote down the date of July 1921, the month which followed the approval of the centralist and unitarian Vidovdan Constitution, under the introduction to his book. Seven decades later, the situation changed. That was the actual time of “the greatest human art form”. Some of the art pieces in which it manifests itself in Slovenia have already been mentioned here. Nonetheless, the systems of the state are in operation and the state is a part of the international environment, while we've also witnessed a meteoric rise of some political parties in the last couple of years.
14These findings offer a great variety of possibilities for research. The branch of science that made the most out of these possibilities is politology. These topics were also addressed in the Pogovori o prihodnosti Slovenije (Talks about the future of Slovenia) held at the cabinet of the President of the Republic of Slovenia, Janez Drnovšek, in years 2003–2005 (in years 2009–2011 there were also three talks held by the President of the Republic, Dr Danilo Türk)24 and by the circle of Nova revija magazine (Kdo smo in zakaj imamo državo (Who we are and why we have a state) (1996), Ura evropske resnice za Slovenijo (The Time for the European Truth for Slovenia) (1997), Nekaj je treba storiti (Something has to be done) (2003)).25 The process of democratisation and attainment of independence that took place during the 80s and at the beginning of the 90s was carefully studied by historiography. For the period that followed, historians can not offer much due to the lack of funding for research projects that would focus on these times. Nonetheless, we are proud of two exceptional monographs on the transition of Slovenian economy from socialism to capitalism in the years between 1990 and 2004 or the Slovenian parliamentarism between 1992 and 2012 written by two researches from the Institute of Contemporary History, Dr Aleksander Lorenčič26 and Dr Jure Gašparič.27 Important findings were also made by a professor from the Faculty of Arts at the University of Ljubljana, Dr Božo Repe. In his book about the first president of the Republic of Slovenia, Milan Kučan, Repe illustrated the political development of the Republic of Slovenia until 2002 by describing Kučan's activities.28 Even flames cannot destroy this writing.29
15Nevertheless, to summarise the main findings of the monographs which we pointed out, it is necessary to emphasize that the transition of the economy and the transition to an environment more open in terms of society and trade, deserve to be treated positively from the historical stance regardless of the wild privatisation that casts a shadow over this process. The main reason for such intense privatisation of social and national property was in the lack of legal bases from the very beginning. What is more, despite the warnings of competent institutions, the Slovenian Parliament (often a political "rooster coop"– note by. J. P.) chose not to react. Between the years 1990 and 2004 the social property suffered a loss higher than 104 billion tolars. A small percentage of the population definitely managed to pile up a fortune in that period. The government then was a group of amateurs and neither the politics nor the experts could handle this situation (something similar happened in other transition countries). It turned out that many Slovenian companies were run by dishonest and greedy managers whose main objective was profiteering. Many whom these fraudulent deeds are attributed to acquired their fortune by legal means. This can mostly be attributed to the legal system and politics as the National Assembly did not adopt the much needed laws. Today's situation in society and the economy is not a result of yesterday's events or occurrences in the past couple of years. The answers to why this has happened should be sought at the beginning of our transition period. Slovenia didn't only choose the market economy, but also chose capitalism and everything that goes with it. Slovenian capitalism still has social overtones, but a capitalism adjusted to human needs, like the one we had imagined, is just an illusion.30 We believe that the leading Slovenian analyst of social, cultural and political phenomena in Slovenia, Dr Janez Markeš, made a good observation by saying that the symptom of a “new neoliberal Slovenia” occurred. Gradually and inconspicuously, this symptom is ousting the solidarity from a society that, in the end, does not care for growing inequalities. With the intention to eliminate the old socialist regime, the society does not perceive the solidarity as an essential part of itself.31
16Another significant emphasis from Markeš's findings is that it is
“important to determine what Slovenia as a state should look like in the future as it is becoming more and more obvious that growing inequalities and diminishing solidarity do not contribute to anything. However, the everyday speeches by ministers are still dominated by economic issues. Besides that, there is a shortage of political debates that would revolve around concepts of a socially strong state which would show effort to diminish social inequality.”
17It seems that after many years of defunding social programmes,
"it is time to rethink which type of capitalism is best suitable for Slovenia. Two things are clear: the inequality is growing to the extent that it is no longer acceptable, even though it is unnoticeable to many, and that to speak of neoliberalism as of an immense illusion that does not contribute to the state in any way and that may, in the form of extreme social situations, nationalism and other phenomena, cause almost irreparable damage, is of public interest. It appears that capitalism deserves a second chance to promote innovation and develop business flexibility and capabilities. However, in the last two decades, capitalism is being substituted with neoliberalism, a self-referencing ideology of elites that Slovenia, due to its size, will never be able to have. And it seems right that Slovenia is free of elites, as they are a mockery to humanism and to the freethinking view on life which is considered as a basic value and protected by the constitution."32
18The analysis of the transition in politics is the topic of interest of the second monograph that primarily addresses the question of trustworthiness. In the political emotional rhetoric of the modern state, trustworthiness has played quite a significant role from the 19th century onwards. “Trust is the most essential aspect of life. Everything is based on trust, it even became a part of the constitutional system.” The opinion polls carried out during the year serve to determine the level of trust in political institutions. The results show that the National Assembly is considered less trustworthy, as it is always among the least trusted. On the scale of trustworthiness, only the political parties are traditionally lower. If we look at the prime minister instead of the government as a whole, we can notice that the prime minister enjoys a higher degree of trust, while the president of the republic is considered as the most trustworthy. This is not surprising, as people are not exactly familiar with a single politician's doings. They remember only the improprieties, mistakes and scandals that accompany the parliament's actions. In addition, politicians are not members of unions or assemblies (they do have their own association). They deal with their rivals in an uncensored and unsympathetic way, unlike in any other profession. The question remains: how long and to what extent can trust be left to wither, if it is supposed to be one of the pillars of democracy.33 This might be closely related to the fact pointed out in the third monograph: that the first president of the republic tried to reach the so-called Third National Concensus (after the national unification at the plebiscite for Slovenia's independence and the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia). This was an agreement with the purpose to determine what to do with the people and the state after the independence and after joining the Euro-Atlantic Group. The consensus on ethical foundations of Slovenia and the sense of its existence were not reached. However, even upon the termination of his presidency, Kučan invested a lot of effort into reaching this consensus.34
19What is there to say at the end? There is an enormous amount of work to be done and the longer Slovenia remains independent, the more work will have to be carried out. Hopefully, it will be carried out not only by implementing new approaches based on anthropological-interpretative and theoretical bases that avoid historical aspects and often remain unfulfilled, but also by considering the public opinion and citizens' needs. Here is to hoping that this wish has its consequences. Just like Dr Karel Triller, a prominent representative of the Liberal Narodna napredna stranka (National Progressive Party) hoped in 1906, when elaborating on the programme of his party.35 I also owe you an explanation about the other half of my life: according to the principle of freedom of choice, I have kept it. I do not know what the person from Vegova Street did with his half.
Jurij Perovšek
1V letih slovenske samostojnosti, ki so nekaj časa zdržala pretvorbo v »zgodbo o uspehu«, smo se srečali tudi z vprašanjem, kaj so o sebi razkrili Slovenci po odhodu iz večnacionalnih držav, v katerih so po svojem končnem spoznanju videli nacionalni in demokratični potop. To vprašanje je v zgodovinskem položaju po letu 1991 še toliko bolj pritegujoče, ker nad nami ni ne dunajskega, ne beograjskega pokrova in ne pokrova prejšnje monistične politične oblasti.
2Po odhodu iz Avstro-Ogrske monarhije v Kraljevino Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev/Jugoslavijo leta 1918 so Slovenci pričakovali, da bodo prišli v »zaželeno deželo«. A ni bilo tako. Z avtonomijo ni bilo nič, narode so ustavno izbrisali in prelili v srbsko-hrvaško-slovensko narodnost, uradni jezik je nosil prav tako ime, t. i. slovenskih polkov iz avstrijske dobe ni bilo več, slabih dvajset let kasneje, na tedanji državni praznik 1. decembra 1936, pa je mariborska Neodvisnost k temu še zapisala, da se Slovenci »ne čutimo skoraj več kot enota, ampak kot mešanica različnih plemen, med katerimi ni nobene skupnosti, ampak je samo neizprosen, brezobziren in brutalen boj do iztrebljenja. Ta plemena so ,klerikalci’, ,liberalci’, ,marksisti’ in drugi, kakor se že vsi imenujejo. Vlogo podpihovanja strasti in sovraštva pa vrši naš od teh strank odvisni tisk, ki dan za dnem zastruplja naše ozračje. Zato ni v njem, in po njem tudi v naši javnosti, nikjer nobenih vrhovnih in nespremenljivih narodnih načel, nikjer nobenih jasnih in trdnih ciljev.«
3In naših petindvajset let? Slovenci so dosegli meddržavnopravni položaj – Republiko Slovenijo, njihov jezik je iz druge Jugoslavije prenesel svoj uradni značaj, dobili smo svojo vojsko, kultura in šport sta požela več izjemnih uspehov v tujini, mediji so se še bolj razvili. Slovenci so se poslavljali kot »prehlajeni predmet zgodovine«. Avtor omenjene oznake Tomaž Šalamun je to izrekel v slavnostni besedi ob slovenskem kulturnem prazniku leta 2000. Slovenijo je videl kot lepo, relativno bogato, živo in ustvarjalno deželo. Čudež civilizacijskega pospeška se je dogajal z veliko silo.
4Vendar je nastal »raj z napako«. Ideološka »plemena« so ostala in poleg starih uporabljajo še nova orodja boja – izkušnjo drugega svetovnega spopada, prejšnje družbe in zdaj še slovenske osamosvojitve. V novem slovenskem svetu je, medtem ko so tisti, ki so s polnimi pljuči zadihali narodno čustvo in pričakovali zgodovinski dvig slovenstva, nastopila »the open season«: lovska sezona olastninjevalnih in drugih predatorjov. Prikladnost iger brez kruha – ideoloških in političnih vojn, vključno s tisto, skorajda državljansko, na spletu, za tako početje ni (bila) vprašljiva. Ob tem pomanjkanje spoznavnih moči, potovanja v denar, adrenalin, človeško brezbrižnost in čimmanj v duhá, govorijo o veliki vrednostni oseki. O tem sta najbolje spregovorila eden vodilnih slovenskih psihoanalitikov dr. Matjaž Lunaček in premišljevalec slovenstva akademik Niko Grafenauer. Prvi je na vprašanje, kateremu tipu pacienta ta trenutek ustreza slovenska družba, predlani odgovoril: »Zagotovo narcističnemu, saj družbeno okolje to omogoča, celo zahteva. (…) Generacija, že odrasla v sistemu, ki je drsel v današnjo situacijo, nima razvitih etičnih in moralnih norm. »Največje zlo v naši družbi sta nekrivdnost in brezsramnost.« Podobno je leta 2011 ugotovil Niko Grafenauer, ki se mu glede na položaj, ki ga zaznava, »slovenski samomor prikazuje le še v eni sami celostni obliki. Za to stanje pa ni več kriv nihče drug od nas, saj smo, kakršni smo – prepirljivci, klikaši, tatovi, ciniki, nastopači itd. – skratka srenja brez vizije in državljanske samoodgovornosti.« Ob tem je leta 2014 veleposlanik Bojan Grobovšek zagovarjal še razpolovitev veljave slovenskega uradnega jezika. Po njegovem »bi bilo za Slovenijo morda zelo dobro, če bi se poleg nacionalnega uradnega jezika slovenščine uvedlo še en uradni jezik, konkretno angleščina«. V resnici pa bi bilo dobro, če bi pazili na slovenščino, saj njeno znanje v govoru in pisavi postaja vedno bolj oddaljena dobrina.
5O povedanem je mnogo raziskovalnih izzivov. Najbolj jim je nasproti stopila politologija, zgodili pa so se tudi Pogovori o prihodnosti Slovenije pri predsedniku republike dr. Janezu Drnovšku v letih 2003–2005 in predsedniku dr. Danilu Türku v letih 2009–2011, ter dejanja kroga Nove revije (Kdo smo in zakaj imamo državo (1996), Ura evropske resnice za Slovenijo (1997), Nekaj je treba storiti (2003)). V proces demokratizacije in osamosvojitve konec osemdesetih in v začetku devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja se je kvalitetno poglobilo zgodovinopisje. Za kasnejši čas zgodovinarji še ne moremo pokazati veliko, tudi zaradi nedodeljenih gmotnih sredstev za izvedbo nanj osredinjenih raziskovalnih projektov. Vseeno pa se lahko pohvalimo z odličnima monografijama raziskovalcev Inštituta za novejšo zgodovino v Ljubljani – dr. Aleksandra Lorenčiča (Prelom s starim in začetek novega: tranzicija slovenskega gospodarstva iz socializma v kapitalizem (1990–2004), 2012) in dr. Jureta Gašpariča (Državni zbor 1992–2012: o slovenskem parlamentarizmu, 2012). Zunaj inštituta je slovenski politični razvoj po letu 1992 v svojo knjigo Milan Kučan, prvi predsednik (2015) vključil profesor Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani dr. Božo Repe.
6Dela je pred nami veliko in čim dlje bo živela Slovenija, tem več ga bo. Upajmo, da kljub »antropološko-interpretativnim«, raznovrstnim resničnemu zgodovinskemu tkivu ogibajočim se teoretskim in dostikrat le v literaturi slonečim novim pristopom, tudi s posluhom za narod in njegove probleme.
* research councellor, PhD, Institute of Contemporary History, Kongresni trg 1, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, jurij.perovsek@inz.si
1. Jurij Perovšek, Liberalizem in vprašanje slovenstva. Nacionalna politika liberalnega tabora v letih 1918–1929 [Liberalism and the Question of Slovenianism. National Policy in the Liberal Camp from 1918 to 1929] (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 1996), 46–65.
2. “Praznik slovenskega ženstva” [Slovenian Women Day], Slovenski narod, 26 March 1918, 2.
3. “Neodvisnost” [Independence], Neodvisnost, 1 December 1936, 1.
4. Ivan Hribar, “Uprava Jugoslavije” [Yugoslavia administration], Slovenec, 15 October 1918, 2.
5. Mitja Ribičič, “Patriotizem” [Patriotism], Učiteljski tovariš, 13 January 1927, 2.
6. Tomaž Šalamun, “Duma 1964,” Naši razgledi, 9 May 1964, 178.
7. Tomaž Šalamun, “Govor na prireditvi ob slovenskem kulturnem prazniku 2000” [Speech at the event held for the Prešeren Day 2000], in: Prešernov sklad 2000 [Prešerenʼs Fund 2000] (Ljubljana: upravni odbor Prešernovega sklada, 2000), 4, 5.
8. Marko Bucik, “Raj z napako. Slovenija leta 2041. V kakšni državi si želim živeti čez 25 let in kako priti do nje?” [A flawed paradise. Slovenia in 2041. In what kind of country do I want to live in 25 years and how to achieve it?], Delo, 7 June 2016, 5.
9. Taras Kermauner, “Vladimir Bartol – predhodnik današnje slovenske moderne literature” [Vladimir Bartol – the predecessor of today’s modern Slovenian literature], in: Vladimir Bartol, Demon in Eros. Al Araf [Demon and Eros. Al Araf] (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1974), 441.
10. Šalamun, “Govor 2000,” 4.
11. Edvard Kocbek, “Slovenski človek” [The Slovenian Man], Dejanje 1, No. 1 (1938): 2.
12. Matjaž Lunaček, ”Največje zlo v naši družbi sta nekrivdnost in brezsramnost” [The Biggest Evil in Our Society are Blamelessness and Shamelessness], acquired 8 June 2016, http://siol.net/novice/siol/psihoanalitik-matjaz-lunacek-najvecje-zlo-v-nasi-druzbi-sta-nekrivdnost-in-brezsramnost-242309.
13. Matija Grah, Borut Škodlar and Bojana Avguštin Avčin, “Na robu obupa, na robu blaznosti. Mobing, psihično nasilje na delovnem mestu“ [At the edge of despair, at the edge of insanity. Mobbing, psychological harassment at work], Delo: sobotna priloga, 10 March 2012, 10, 11.
14. MOBING, acquired 29 June 2016, http://www.mobing.si/slo/pravna_ureditev.html.
15. Niko Grafenauer, “Smo vaška srenja brez vizije in državljanske odgovornosti” [We are a village community without a vision and civic responsibility], Delo: sobotna priloga, 29 November 2011, 26.
16. Vasilij Melik, “Ivan Hribar in njegovi Spomini” [Ivan Hribar and his Memories], in: Ivan Hribar, Moji spomini: II del [My memories: part II] (Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1984), 654.
17. Bojan Grobovšek, “Zakaj Slovenija ni Švica” [Why is Slovenia not Switzerland], Misteriji 21, No. 250 (2014): 25.
18. 21st regular session of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 15 July 2016.
19. Boris A. Novak, “V slovenskem nacionalnem značaju je premalo mediteranskega duha” [There is too little Mediterranean spirit in the Slovenian national character], Primorski dnevnik, 7 August 2001, 8.
20. Boris A. Novak, “Zagovor slovenščine” [Defending Slovenian language], Avdio/video ǀ za govor SLOVENŠČINE, acquired 18 September 2016, http://www.zagovor-slovenscine.si/audiovideo/, 3rd and 4th part.
21. Novak, “V slovenskem nacionalnem značaju je premalo mediteranskega duha,” 8.
22. “Veličasten shod javnih in zasebnih nameščencev” [Impressive rally of the public and private post-holders], Slovenec, 15 March 1923, 2.
23. Dragotin Lončar, Politično življenje Slovencev: od 4. januarja 1797. do 6. januarja 1919. leta [The Political Life of Slovenians: from 4 January 1797 to 6 January 1919] (Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1921), 129.
24. COBISS / OPAC, view 18 June 2016, http://www.cobiss.si/scripts/cobiss?ukaz=getid&lani=si. Search parameter Pogovori pri predsedniku republike, 1–3.
25. France Bučar et al., “Kdo smo in zakaj imamo državo. Pobuda za ponovno presojo slovenskega narodnega položaja” [Who are we and why do we have a country. Initiative for a reassessment of the Slovenian national situation], Nova revija 15, No. 167 (1996), supplement Ampak, 2–6. Drago Jančar et al., Ura evropske resnice za Slovenijo [The Time for the European Truth for Slovenia] (Buenos Aires: Svobodna Slovenija, 1997). Barbara Brezigar et al., “Nekaj je treba storiti. Državljanska pobuda” [Something has to be done. The citizens’ initiative], Dolenjski list, 6 March 2003, 20.
26. Aleksander Lorenčič, Prelom s starim in začetek novega. Tranzicija slovenskega gospodarstva iz socializma v kapitalizem (1990–2004) [The end of an old regime and the beginning of a new one. Slovenian economy’s transition from socialism to capitalism (1990–2004)] (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2012).
27. Jure Gašparič, Državni zbor 1992–2012. O slovenskem parlamentarizmu [National Assembly 1992–2012. About the Slovenian parliamentarianism] (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2012).
28. Božo Repe, Milan Kučan, prvi predsednik [Milan Kučan, the First President] (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2015).
29. This is a reference to the unsuccessful burning of the mentioned book on 19 December 2015 in front of Milan Kučan's residence in Ljubljana. The book burning was organised by a small group of citizens of the Republic of Slovenia.
30. Lorenčič, Prelom s starim in začetek novega, 444–46, 448, 451, 452.
31. Janez Markeš, “Let nad nekim gnezdom” (Flying over a nest), Delo: sobotna priloga, 27 August 2016, 7.
32. Ibid.
33. Gašparič, Državni zbor 1992–2012, 296, 300, 301.
34. Repe, Milan Kučan, prvi predsednik, 500, 581.
35. Karel Triller, “Pred shodom narodnonapredne stranke” [Before the Assembly of the National Progressive Party], Slovenski narod, 23 March 1906, 2.