No source, born digital.
Contributions to Contemporary History is one of the central Slovenian scientific historiographic journals, dedicated to publishing articles from the field of contemporary history (the 19th and 20th century).
The journal is published three times per year in Slovenian and in the following foreign languages: English, German, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Italian, Slovak and Czech. The articles are all published with abstracts in English and Slovenian as well as summaries in English.
Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino je ena osrednjih slovenskih znanstvenih zgodovinopisnih revij, ki objavlja teme s področja novejše zgodovine (19. in 20. stoletje).
Revija izide trikrat letno v slovenskem jeziku in v naslednjih tujih jezikih: angleščina, nemščina, srbščina, hrvaščina, bosanščina, italijanščina, slovaščina in češčina. Članki izhajajo z izvlečki v angleščini in slovenščini ter povzetki v angleščini.
Prispevek obravnava vprašanje jugoslovanskih disidentov v zvezi s
sistemom komunističnega upravljanja in delovanja države pod vodstvom Josipa
Broza Tita. V širšem kontekstu je analizirana vloga kritične inteligence, tj.
kulture disidentstva, v značilnih jugoslovanskih okvirjih. Prispevek vsebuje
krajši pregled posebnosti jugoslovanskih disidentov, predvsem razlik v njihovem
dojemanju, vrst kritik in medsebojnih odnosov, ki so jih imeli kot nasprotniki
režima, pa tudi različnih usod posameznikov. Poseben poudarek je bil na stališču
Zahoda do jugoslovanskih disidentov, ki se je precej razlikoval v primerjavi s
stališčem do disidentov iz Sovjetske zveze in drugih držav
realsocializma.
Ključne besede: Disidenti, Josip Broz Tito, titoizem, Jugoslavija, komunizem
The paper deals with the issue of the Yugoslav dissidents with
regard to the system of communist governance and the functioning of the state
led by Josip Broz Tito. In the wider context the role of critical intelligentsia
– a culture of dissent – is analyzed within distinctive Yugoslav frameworks. The
paper includes a shorter overview of the particularity of the Yugoslav
dissidents, above all the differences in their perceptions, type of criticism,
their mutual relations – as the opponents to the regime, and different destinies
of individuals. Special emphasis was put on the West’s position of Yugoslav
dissidents which differed considerably in comparison with dissidents from the
Soviet Union and other states of real socialism.
Keywords: Dissidents, Josip Broz Tito, Titoism, Yugoslavia,
Communism
The nature of the post–war Yugoslav version of a dissident is closely related to the
system of governance and values of the Yugoslav socialist society (Titoism),
embodied by Josip Broz Tito. According to many indicators, the Yugoslav sovereign
was an autocrat. But what was the nature of his dictatorship? How did he govern and
what was the state he ruled? Josip Broz Tito, the first name of Yugoslav communism,
the guerrilla leader who has gained fame and respect even with his ideological
opponents during and after the Second World War, ruled the post–war Yugoslav
communist state “with an iron hand in a velvet glove.” Historian Ivo Banac reveals
in Broz’s individuality the persistent historical paradigm for the South Slav zone:
“ill fate of the Balkans” which exhibits “the need for order in a mobile encampment,
faith in an imperial idea as the sole guarantor against chaos.”Acta
Turcarum (Zagreb: Durieux), 2006, 32.Habsburška monarhija 1809 – 1918 (Zagreb:
Znanje, 1990), 323, 324., Mladi Krleža i njegovi kritičari 1914. –
1924 (Zagreb: Globus,
1987), 590–91.Hrvatska revija, Vol. 2–3 (1964):
200.
As observed by Aleksa Đilas Yugoslavia was “a country that was difficult to explain
and understand, perhaps even harder for those who lived in it and were not
indifferent to it, but to those who do not carry that experience. It was a land full
of paradoxes.”Jugoslavija koja je odumrla: Uspon, kriza i pad Kardeljeve Jugoslavije (1974-1990) (Zagreb: Prometej,
2003), 495.Beogradska zadaća
– Kako je slaman Milošević (Zagreb: Naklada Szabo A3 data, 2002),
23.Večernji list, April 30, 2005.
The questioning of freedom in the societies ruled by the undisputed authorities
implies the emergence of critical thinking, resistance, and dissent. The
relationship between authoritarian power and opponents to the regime had specific
historical significance in communist societies. In the words of Vaclav Havel: “You
do not become a ‘dissident’ just because you decide one day to take up this most
unusual career. You are thrown into it by your personal sense of responsibility,
combined with a complex set of external circumstances. You are cast out of the
existing structures and placed in a position of conflict with them.”
However, the system of political and social control characteristic to totalitarian regimes in the states of real communism significantly differed in the Yugoslav case. Unlike the other communist states Yugoslavia was under the strong influence of the West – especially in culture (from the early 1950s) and it was relatively open country. The Yugoslav cultural politics was one of the most significant indicators to Yugoslav distinctiveness; it was also relevant to the emergence of the specific Yugoslav culture of dissent as a result of a constant struggle of liberal–minded intellectuals and authoritarian rule. The Yugoslav ambiguities, and afterward the fact that the very state ceased to exist, are probably the reasons why it is not easy to deal with the complex Yugoslav past. A rational and critical approach to the phenomenon of Titoism and Tito’s Yugoslav state still present a challenge to historical analysis.
One of the problems of historical analysis can be identified in the deficit of
historiographic synthesis of wider social scopes in the postwar period. Tito’s
Yugoslavia broke up, and even while it lasted there were weak attempts of more
significant historical synthesis to its past. Serbian historian Andrej Mitrović
notes: “Concerning the past of Yugoslavia it is very important to stress that it has
been not historically sufficiently explored. It doesn’t mean that there had not been
valuable research, but in that context, two external indicators can be considered as
well. How many histories of the Yugoslav state did we produce? Two, three, mostly in
the eighties at the end of the decay of the state. In world history, every country
has dozens of its history, ‘small’ and ‘big’, booklets and multi–editions ...”Vreme, No. 429, Januar 9,
1999.
The phenomenon of culture of dissent in the Yugoslav society, including the that of
dissidents, had its cyclic changes – variations that largely depended on the vague
ambivalences of Titoism: “the ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ periods interchanged; after the period
of release and relative liberalization the period of ‘clash’ would follow, and it
was skillfully maintained as a balance between different ideological currents in
party leadership and confrontation between republics.”Pragmatičari, dogmati, sanjari – hrvatska umjetnost i društvo 1950.–ih godina (Zagreb:
Ina industrija nafte d.d. and Meridijani, 2007), 19.Moja Hrvatska,
HTV, Documentary, August 18, 2011.
An important instrumentality of authority was the cultural policy. Like in other
aspects of the public sphere Tito had the most important role as supreme arbitrator.
All other institutional mechanisms simply followed. Promoting the workers
self–management at the beginning of 1950s the National Assembly “predicted that its
success will depend on how rapidly the cultural development will advance.Jugoslavensvo danas–Pitanja kulture (Zagreb:
Globus, 1982), 128.Školske novine, January 7, 1982.
Culture went through non–linear metamorphosis just as did the Yugoslav socialist
society as a whole; from the Stalinist phase of showdown with “national enemies” –
when there was strict censorship and rigid party control over all aspects of life
including culture, until the end of the eighties when communist officials publicly
stated that they were no longer able to control the social processes that ultimately
led to the emergence of political pluralism. The film director Đorđe Kadijević (Praznik, Pohod) who was a representative of socially engaged
Yugoslav film – so–called Blake Wave – described the paradox
of Titoism: “My films, albeit forbidden, went to world festivals and had great
success.” On Tito’s role in cultural policy Kadijević states the following: “As we
know, Tito was the predominant personality in every aspect of our country. He was
not an intellectual, he had no great education, no particular culture, but he had a
genuine interest in art and he supported the artists. In Tito’s time culture was a
constituent part of state politics and systems” (...) Although an
adversary of modern art
– in 1962 Tito spoke explicitly against abstract art – at the same time his ‘soft
Stalinism’ enabled the Museum of Contemporary Art to be built
quite unhindered. A similar paradox is the fact that
the writer Borislav Pekić was
imprisoned but afterward received prestigious literary awards such as Nin’s and October’s.”
An important component of the development of dissent related to the culture of young
people who have been under the strong influence of the West since the 1950s and
especially in the 1960s. This influence, despite the “changes”, will continue until
the fall of the Yugoslav state. The influence of literature, film, and music –
ranging from pop culture to avant–garde streams, were among the younger generations
manifested by action that was not devoid of political connotations. Thus the
conceptual artist Vladimir Dodig Trokut states that members of his 68th generation
were considered a group of “humanists, nihilists, anarchists, anarcho–liberal,
anarcho–humanist, dialectics, disbelievers, rebels and party defectors.” Members of
the “rebel” youth had already formed attitudes in relation to the social situation
and the cultural reality (dialectics of liberation and theology of freedom). As
Trokut states, everything was happening under the watchful eye of the authorities,
who made sure that the behavior of the “rebels” did not escape control; there were
even occasional sanctions. On the other hand, some Communist leaders and
intellectuals, such as Vicko Krstulović, Koča Popović, and Jure Kaštelan, guarded
and supported the alternative path of the younger generation.Bible that was sold in more than 200,000 copies.
Despite the rigid single–party communist system and the persecution of the disobedient, due to an ambiguity of Titoism various forms of a critical thought emerged. Some of the actors who criticized Yugoslav ideology and politics become dissidents.
The phenomenon of a dissident in Tito’s Yugoslavia can be considered from very different perspectives. However, so far no particular typology of the Yugoslav dissident has been formed in humanities and social sciences. There is no considerable attempt to synthesize the historical circumstances and motifs of dissidents; their dissociative “critical potential”, the effector or forms of repression that the government has carried out against the “disinformation”, as there is no complete phenomenological analysis of Titoism. The notion of dissident occurs in very different contexts; it is manifested and evaluated differently in certain phases of Yugoslav history as well as in different parts of Tito’s Yugoslavia.
In general Yugoslav dissidents have been apostrophized as defectors of the Communist
Party. They are also referred as the opponents of the regime; individuals who at
some point emerged in public from “unacceptable positions” and were “excluded” from
public life (although sometimes they were formally not members of the party or of
party structures). In the wider context, they also appear as critics – free
thinkers; their public criticism or “improper” thinking that questioned the
socialist reality – very different manifestations of the culture of dissent – often
led to conflicts with the authorities, including persecution and internment or
isolation. Even in the last decade of the Yugoslav socialist state, when the demands
for democratic reforms increasingly emerged and when it became clear that the party
system is unsustainable – the practice of social control will continue despite the
formal absence of censorship; according to Stipe Šuvar’s report at the Central
Comity CPY’s 7th Session in April 1987, between 1981 and 1985, there were 36
prohibitions of publications: ten newspapers, sixteen books, three journals, two
calendars, two tourist brochures, one geographical map, one bulletin, and poster.
Between 1982 and 1987, claims for “political delinquency” were raised against 2,443
persons (1,748 for verbal delict); the highest in Kosovo (1,020), followed by
Croatia (473), Serbia without the province (306) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (291).
In Slovenia, there were 90, in Montenegro 71, in Macedonia 51 and in Vojvodina 37
persons who were indicted (in court) for political crimes.Jugoslavija, 331.
Already at the level of perception of dissident one can observe very different
opinions. Literate and publicist Miljenko Jergović thinks that Ivan Supek – one of
the most prominent Croatian intellectuals of the post–war period, physicist and
philosopher as well as the rector of the Zagreb
University during the turbulent 1971 Croatian Spring – was not a dissident.
Supek was first of all “a convinced leftist and a Democrat” (despite the fact that
he was a member of the Communist Party before the Second World War; he left the
Party in 1940, among other things, because of disagreement with the party’s
interpretation of Albert Einstein’s thesis that was dismissed as inadmissible in
Moscow).Jutarnji list, April 7, 2015.Heretic on the left Budiša noted: “To preserve internal
freedom, autonomous political thinking, and scientific activity, to be on the side
of his people and belong to the left, it was possible only if one was a dissident.
This has been shown in Supek’s book.”Krivovjerac na ljevici.Disidentstvo u suvremenoj
povijesti, eds. Kisić
Kolanović, et al. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010),
408.Prošlost jedne iluzije – Ogled o komunističkoj ideji u XX. Stoljeću (Zagreb:
Politička kultura, 1997), 395–96.
Various interpretations of the character of “Yugoslav dissident” are related to real
and apparent controversies. In this context, it is interesting to note how political
emigrant Bogdan Radica – who was never a member of the Communist Party (he was a
sympathizer of the Croatian Peasant Party) – is regarded as a dissident in today’s
post–communist perspective. On the Croatian historical portal Radica is
apostrophized as “formally (...) the first Yugoslav dissident, even eight years
before “Milovan Đilas”Hrvatski povijesni portal, accessed June 18, 2018,
http://povijest.net/bogdan-radica-hrvatska-veza-sa-svijetom/.
Hrvatska 1945
(Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1992), 240.
The fact of Radica’s active support to Tito’s Partisans during World War II did not
bother the Yugoslav regime’s publicists to disqualify him not only as a “dissident”
but as an “Ustasha” as well (since he belonged to Croatian political emigration).
When Radica met with Milovan Đilas in the late sixties in Princeton and New York (he
wrote about meeting Đilas in the Croatian Review magazine),
Zagreb daily Večernji list published the
following information: “In America, Đilas met with some Ustasha leaders including
the cutthroat ideologist Bogdan Radica.”Večernji list, June 11, 1984.Hrvatska revija, Vol. 3 (1969): 255–56.
The fate of many dissidents was intertwined in a variety of ways (among the other
relationship between Tito as a dissident and his victims who have become
dissidents). In the immediate post–war period, innumerable intellectuals in a short
time were struck by a new power that left the policy of the National Front and
imposed a communist political monopoly. Among them were writers of various political
affinities such as Edvard Kocbek and Borislav Pekić. Despite the labeling by the
authorities – Pekić was imprisoned, and Kocbek under supervision – both writers
managed to publish remarkable and award–winning works. Politician and professor
Dragoljub Jovanović who sympathized with the social ideas of the CP in the prewar
Kingdom of Yugoslavia and came into conflict with the then authorities will become
the victim of the communist regime.Portreti
disidenata (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2007),
228.1966 Đilas was finally granted amnesty after nine years spent in jail). He even traveled abroad and gave a series of interviews for the foreign press. However, he was constantly under
the watchful eye of authorities and exposed to defamation; e.g. in 1984 Večernji list published a feuilleton (as mentioned
previously) on his “traitorous behavior”.
The change in public climate was noticeably different in the second half of the
eighties when a liberal press started to publish “floods of forbidden literature”;
opening also meant an intensified interest for the dissidents.Start,
No. 521, January 7, 1989.Start Đilas was presented as a “revolutionary, an apostate,
dangerous taboo–theme, multi–year political prisoner”; “About Đillas everybody knew
everything and in fact very little is known and most of all as clichés: He is a
traitor...”; “how many people know that he has spent his entire life dealing with
literature? As every man who renounced his glorious past and shifted from ‘good’ to
‘evil’ boys, the portrait of Đilas is composed on semi–information, stereotypes, and
mythologies about ‘the enemy of the state ‘no. 1’ (…) he was “a man who was
dismissed in 1954. from all of his duties and classified as an anarchist and
revisionist”; at the same time he was called by the press as ‘the last and largest
Eastern European dissident after the Saharov rehabilitation’, and also the last
living member of the pre–war ruling CPY Politburo. That triple position is
sufficiently bizarre and intriguing to be completely ignored. At the very least, he
is one of the most controversial witnesses of our recent history.”
Similar public engagements and even the connection to the same events reflected
differently to the destiny of individual dissidents. Daniel Ivin, who was not a
member of the Communist Party, deserved the qualification of the “suspect” by
participating in the “dissident gathering in Zadar” in 1966 where he was “elected
president of the publishing council of the first independent newspapers in
Yugoslavia Slobodna Riječ”. The magazine was supposed to
promote “multiparty” system (allegedly under the influence by Miroslav Krleža). Ivin
was arrested and interned for two months in Belgrade’s central detention center.
“The conspiracy group” consisting of intellectuals – Mihajlo Mihajlov, Predrag
Ristić, Marijan Batinić, Franjo Zenko, Miro Glavurtić, Mladen Srbinović, Leonid
Šejk, Slobodan Mašić, and others – was charged with the constructed indictment which
included allegations about preparations for the assassination of comrade Tito.”
After the indictment was dismissed and Ivin was released he got an invitation of St
Antony’s College and so he went to England (“British diplomacy followed him as” the
most rational member “of the Yugoslav group of dissidents because he was looking for
a way how to democratize society”). He then worked at the Schweizerisches
Ost–Institut in Bern where he published the book Revolution and
Evolution in Yugoslavia. At the end of 1969, he returned to Yugoslavia and
collaborated on the project of the founding of the Croatian Economic Bank with a
prominent Croatian communist and politician Većeslav Holjevac. In 1970 he signed a
contract with Television Zagreb for the series “Croatian Statehood Story” (both
projects were ultimately not realized due to Holjevac’s death and repression after
the collapse of Croatian Spring). In the continuation of his career, Ivin will write
about the most famous Yugoslav dissident Milovan Đilas and about Andrija Hebrang,
the most influential Croat communist who was killed in unknown circumstances. In the
late 1980s, he was engaged in Croatia in promoting multiparty reform and human
rights.Regional
Express, accessed August 13, 2018, http://www.regionalexpress.hr/site/more/uz–80.–roendan–daniela–ivina.
Mihajlo Mihajlov, an assistant at the Faculty of Philosophy in Zadar, had a
different destiny. Like Ivin and other intellectuals who tried to organize a
democratic forum in Zadar in 1966 Mihajlov was convinced that “social and political
conditions have matured for the establishment of competitive organizations to the
Communist Party”; he was actually exposed to the persecution since 1965 because of
the essay The Summer of Moscow 1964, which was categorized as
a “defamation” insulting the Soviet Union” (in time when Tito was establishing
closer relations to USSR). Despite the authorities pressure, Mihajlov insisted on
holding a Zadar summit and launching a magazine with the aim of establishing a
review of democratic profiles which will become “the core of a democratic
socio–political movement.”Disidentstvo u suvremenoj
povijesti, eds. Kisić
Kolanović et al. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za
povijest, 2010), 362.
Some individuals, such as Adem Demaçi and Marko Veselica, condemned for “hostile
activity” and nationalism, were apostrophized as an Albanian and Croatian “Mandela”
for serving long–term prison sentences. Prior to the conflict with the Communist
authorities, Demaçi was – at least as a nominal – part of the “system” (from “Tito’s
pioneer” to the opposition Albanian revolutionary), and Marko Veselica was one of
the party personnel who actively participated in the suppression of student protests
in Zagreb in 1968. A particular chapter on dissidence would be a story on
intellectuals who confronted Communist authorities in different periods of Yugoslav
socialism and with various motives. Many intellectuals, especially philosophers and
sociologists gathered around the
Praxis magazine, actively participated
in student protests in 1968. Some of them, especially in Belgrade, experienced the
exclusion of the Party, various forms of pressures and even dismissals.
Particularly interesting was the case of Predrag Matvejević. After completing his
studies, Matvejević spent two years in Paris, where he acquired a Ph.D. in Sorbonne.
He returned to Yugoslavia at the full swing of the student protest in 1968. The ban
of his text “What is the common protest of the students of Europe” will be later
evaluated “as his promotion in the line of disagreements.” A few years later he
voluntarily “auto–suspended himself” from the League of Communists when “the
critiques on his account became more and more laud”; he explained that he had joined
the Party as a student “because he did not appear to be in the rift with the party
in which were then Miroslav Krleža, Marko Ristic, Ivo Andrić, Ranko Marinković,
Petar Šegedin, and many others.” Matvejević’s even dare to write an open letter to
President Tito, in which – despite all his merits – he asked him to depart from his
duties due to his age. He didn’t suffer any significant consequences.Start, January
7, 1989, 37, 39.
In the later period of Yugoslavia, when the party was weakened many Yugoslav
dissidents collaborated “irrespective of whether they were left or right”; Marko
Veselica stated that “he regularly contacted Đilas and Belgrade lawyer Jovan
Barović.”Vjesnik, October 1, October 2, 2005. Jugoslavija, 333.
Due to the general appearance of the collapse of communism “dissidents throughout
Eastern Europe become louder (especially in Czechoslovakia – with Charter 77; and in
Poland – with Solidarity)”; this has only slightly affected the activities of
Yugoslav dissidents.Jugoslavija, 333.
With the collapse of communism, and then the Yugoslav state, dissidents become a
sort of relic of the past despite the fact that in some cases (like Croatia) some of
the leading positions were occupied by communist dissidents (Franjo Tuđman, Stipe
Mesić). New circumstances have also produced new controversies with regard to the
phenomenon of a dissident. After the dramatic changes, “a few mentioned the
dissidents and especially praised them.”
It is interesting to note the perception of the “new Croatian dissident” in the
early 1990s; more precisely, the fate of individuals who “became dissidents and
exiles from the new state of Croatia” despite the proclamation of democracy. Thus in
an article “Why did the Croatian dissidents disappear” (dissidents from the period
of socialist Croatia and Yugoslavia), the author registers the emergence of “new
dissidents.”The Mediterranean Breviary”; due to his political
attitude and criticism which directly referred to Croatian president Franjo Tuđman,
Matvejević become “persona non grata in his homeland or, more
simply – a dissident.” As noticed by the author it was a paradox since
Matvejević actively defended dissident Tuđman while he was prosecuted by the
communist authorities in the early 1980s. Matvejević was then the president of the
Croatian PEN and advocated suspension of persecution of individuals who opposed the
communist regime. Only a few years later Matvejević and Tuđman found themselves in
reverse positions with one significant difference: “In Tuđman case the authorities
become displeased with him and he was persecuted, and in the case of Matvejević he
was displeased with authorities so he becomes dissident of his own will.” In the
category of “new dissidents” – the author also calls them “exiles” – were two
writers Slavenka Drakulić and Dubravka Ugrešić and two actors Rade Šerbeđija and
Mira Furlan. As a basic distinction between the “old” and the “new” dissidents
author emphasize the fact that “virtually none of them was legally persecuted, no
one of them has been deprived of a right of citizenship;” simply “they didn’t feel
comfortable under Tuđman’s regime. So they chose their own paths and destinies, not
wanting to share anything with the rule they perceived as regimes.”
Probably the most important aspect of Yugoslav dissident status in regard to Titoism
wasn’t the objective critical potential or the effect of resistance to the
authorities of the dissidents but the attitude of Western states and their political
and intellectual elites. In the countries of liberal democracy, the perception of
Yugoslav dissidents (as well as political emigration) was not the same as those
towards the opponents to the Soviet Union and other communist states. One of the
reasons for such distinction was embedded in the fact that Tito’s regime was
perceived “on the seductive theory of socialism with the ‘human face’” which since
the 1950s served as an alternative to a rigid Soviet model”; therefore, “it was not
desirable that dissidents create an image on Tito’s Yugoslavia as an unfree and
repressive society.”
In a discussion of “communist renegades” at the meeting of Croatian and Serbian
historians (under the 10th Dialogue at the Faculty of
Philosophy in Osijek, 2005) former dissident Daniel Ivin testified: “The main
factors of the West were in quite a disagreement with dissidents in Yugoslavia.
Đilas and then others – Praxis first, Mihajlov group, then
the Zagreb Spring and Belgrade Liberals, and others; Yugoslav dissidents were always
more a nuisance than someone who should be supported ... That is why the West’s
attitude to dissidents through whole Cold War period was a double–natured: a
wholehearted support for those inside Soviet bloc and a somewhat confused or
improper relationship with those in Yugoslavia, often none.”
Similar observations come from one of the most prominent intellectuals in the ranks
of Croatian political emigration Bogdan Radica, who was in a position to communicate
directly with some of the most famous Yugoslav dissidents. As an expert on
geopolitics and international relations and a distinguished US and American culture
expert Radica often published articles focusing on the relationship of the West –
primarily America – to the rest of the world (The World Between
America and the Soviet Union, Democracy and Liberation
from Communism, The World Revolution and America,
etc. published in Croatian Review in early 1960s). In his
critical comments, he also recalls the position of Tito’s Yugoslavia in cold–war
conditions. Although the system embodied by the Yugoslav sovereign for Radica was a
negation of liberty, and Tito himself was a communist Machiavellian dictator, he did
not deny his statehood capacity, above all the ability to “manipulate” the West.
Thus, he notes that Churchill’s “Oxford and Cambridge boys who were so zealous on –
so–called – Tito’s charm – while they were in the Bosnian mountains and Dalmatian
islands” (during WWII), mainly spoke on Josip Broz Tito affirmatively.Hrvatska
revija, December 1961, 341.Machiavellian skills.
Concerning this aspect of “the art of ruling”, Radica’s observations on the global
influences of Tito’s “third path” are also interesting. In his opinion it has
overshadowed the critical sharpness of the West, leading to a disadvantage of the
Yugoslav dissidents. In the analysis of the success of the phenomenon of Titoism
among the small peoples, Radica, not with surprise but also with bitterness, notes
that “Tito was right” when “politics of his country organized to set aside and see
what side would be victorious” in the conflict between America and Russia. Tito has
“given to the intelligentsia and leadership of these peoples a technique and a
mechanism for exploiting the West, ideologically and economically supported by the
same West.” Moreover, “although Tito is still a communist who” in reality did not
change his inner system, that fact did not concern anyone; “American official policy
has supported Tito’s experiment with financial aid,” factually contributing to
“increase Titos’s position in that part of the world.”Hrvatska revija, June 1960, 168.Foreign Affairs or even Problems of
Communism, which can not be said to be leftist, but rather represent the
most responsible American point of view. So the USA breaks down and crashes the
foundations of all its policies.”
Of course, the benevolent relationship between the West and the Tito’s Yugoslavia –
as Radica registers, reflected in the international circumstances of the divided
block. First of all the West considered dissidents as “ideological ally in the Cold
War.”
Nevertheless, Western estimates of dissident potential are also interesting to
consider. Thus Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor at the time US
President Jimmy Carter administration examines in 1978 what will happen with
Yugoslavia after Tito’s death (which “seeks to ensure the continuity of his truly
great work through collective leadership”).Upotreba Srbije – optužbe i priznanja Draže Markovića (Beograd:
Beseda, 1990), 82.Praxis and similar). These actions should be
maximally linked to the ‘human rights’ campaign and the ‘third basket’ from
Helsinki, which Yugoslav communists often call upon. Some international
organizations for political convictions (Amnesty International) can also be used in
this plan.”Upotreba Srbije, 83.
The ratings of the disadvantaged position of Yugoslav dissidents (and political
emigration from Yugoslavia) in the West – in relation to the dissidents from the
communist states of the East Bloc, coincide with experiences of the dissidents
themselves (Marko Veselica, Mihajlo Mihajlov, Zdravko Gvero, Daniel Ivin ...):
“Dissidents in the former Yugoslavia had utterly different meaning – but also as an
echo to the West – in comparison to those in the Soviet Union and other
real–socialist countries.”
Yugoslav dissidents have been profiled as a very different set of oppositions to communist rule. For these reasons, it is not possible to unambiguously determine the character of the Yugoslav dissident. To a large extent, the dissidents were linked to the various forms of a critical–oriented intelligentsia and political motives that developed after the opening of Yugoslavia towards the West in the early 1950s. As a system of authority and values, Titoism was based on ambivalences made up of the repression and control exercised by the communist authorities and on the other hand by allowing certain liberties whose boundary as the supreme arbitrator was mainly determined by Tito himself. Despite the periodic purges of political opponents who often become dissidents it can be argued that the development of critical thought and peculiar culture of dissent has been a persistent tendency in the development of the Yugoslav society. With the collapse of communism and the SFRY the Yugoslav dissidents lost importance as a political alternative.
The article deals with the phenomenon of specific Yugoslav dissidence and culture of
dissent, primarily due to the international status of Tito’s Yugoslavia and Titoism as a system of values and governance. The opening up
of Yugoslavia to the West after the split with Stalin in 1948 led to the significant
influence of Western culture on the Yugoslav communist society. This influence
contributed to the appearance of criticism, which sometimes led to various forms of
dissidence. However, due to a tolerant attitude of the Western countries towards
Tito’s communist regime, dissidents did not have the same status as those from the
Soviet Union and other states of real socialism. Furthermore, Tito’s ambivalent
cultural politics – as an important aspect of his governance – also affected the
status of Yugoslav dissidents. During the phases of liberalization of Yugoslav
society criticism was tolerated and even encouraged to a certain extent. At the same
time, the Communist party tried to control all aspect of the public sphere. The
supreme arbitrator was often Tito himself.
Prispevek obravnava fenomen specifičnega jugoslovanskega disidentstva (in kulture disidentstva) kot posledico mednarodnega statusa Titove Jugoslavije in titoizma kot sistema vrednot in upravljanja. Odpiranje Jugoslavije proti Zahodu je po sporu s Stalinom leta 1948 pomembno vplivalo na jugoslovansko komunistično družbo. Vpliv zahodne kulture je porajal razne kritike, kar je včasih pripeljalo do različnih oblik disidentstva. Zaradi strpnega odnosa zahodnih držav do Titovega komunističnega režima pa disidenti niso imeli enakega statusa kot tisti iz Sovjetske zveze in drugih realsocialističnih držav. Poleg tega je tudi Titova ambivalentna kulturna politika kot pomemben vidik njegovega upravljanja vplivala na status jugoslovanskih disidentov. V fazah liberalizacije jugoslovanske družbe so kritike do neke mere tolerirali in celo spodbujali. Hkrati pa je Komunistična partija poskušala nadzorovati vse vidike javne sfere. Vrhovni arbiter je bil pogosto Tito sam.