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‘Peace in Security’ and the ‘Bridge Border’. 
The Italian Centre-Left and Yugoslavia in resolving the Question of Trieste

IZVLEČEK
»MIR V VARNOSTI« IN »MEJA - MOST«. ITALIJANSKA LEVA SREDINA IN JUGOSLAVIJA PRI PRESEGANJU TRŽAŠKEGA VPRAŠANJA


ABSTRACT

The essay presents several ideas regarding the management of the ‘Adriatic Question’ in the period following World War II. It focuses particular attention to the strategies of the political centre-left, of ‘Moroteism’, and of ‘border Catholicism’ aimed at overcoming the legacy of the conflict and achieving normalisation of Italo-Yugoslav relations after the return of Trieste to Italy in 1954.

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The analysis reconstructs the conciliatory path of two bordering states, formerly divided by fierce national, political, and ideological rivalry. Drawing a parallel between the choices made centrally and those made locally, the work furthermore examines the connection between Aldo Moro’s ‘Ostpolitik’ and the line taken by Trieste’s Christian Democrats, both of which sought to put an end to controversy on the eastern border - following the so-called ‘defence of Italianness’ (1945-1954) - in a situation characterised by a lowering of tensions between the blocs, by the reorganisation of international Communism, and by the multilateralism of the Helsinki Conference. The aim of the paper is therefore to shed light on how and with what consequences Moro’s ‘Peace in Security’ and the ‘Bridge Border’ strategy - the leading principles of the Julian Christian Democrats throughout the 1960s and 1970s - established on the one hand a relationship of collaboration with Tito’s Yugoslavia (culminating in the Treaty of Osimo in 1975) and on the other designed a new political, economic, and national function for the peripheral region of Venezia Giulia, whose sovereignty had long been contested and which had been severely penalised in the aftermath of the Second World War.

The long wave of the Trieste Question

‘Peace in security’ and the ‘bridge border’ were the two evocative expressions with which the Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) - the governing party of Italy and of Trieste throughout the post-Second World War period - denoted in the 1960s and 1970s the objectives of the discussions conducted between Italy and Yugoslavia. Much had changed since the post-1945 years, when the two countries had engaged in a fierce dispute on the assignation of Venezia Giulia. Amid the climate of détente in Europe, Rome and Belgrade were able to pursue a new strategy of dialogue which would definitively resolve the dispute on the frontier that had continued even after the peace treaty, with moments of acute tension in bilateral relations. In both the centre and the periphery, the Christian Democrats and the centre-left attached great importance to pacification of relations with neighbouring states, and in particular with the nearby socialist republic, within the framework of


the so-called Italian Ostpolitik. The Treaty of Osimo was the culmination of this approach. It formally resolved the Julian dispute in the spirit of the Helsinki Conference (1975), and it was presented as indispensable for providing Italy with new opportunities for action in the Adriatic theatre, and at the same time giving a renewed function to Trieste and the territories on the country’s eastern frontier.

The ‘Adriatic Question’ had been at the centre of national interest since the Risorgimento, becoming a matter of domestic politics only after the annexation of Venezia Giulia in 1918. Thereafter Rome had had to administer a region traversed by half a century of ethnic frictions between Italians and Slavs. Management of the ‘Austrian heritage’ found the Italian state severely unprepared culturally, even more so than politically and administratively. The weak liberal governments adopted a centralist stance, which greatly displeased the minorities and failed to temper hostilities between national groups. Nor did they have the strength to counter the precocious upsurge of ‘border fascism’ and the onset of a conception of the frontier as the gateway for aggressive penetration of the Balkans and control of the Adriatic.

At international level, during the 1920s and 1930s, relations with Belgrade were frequently strained, for various reasons: the myth of the ‘mutilated victory’, the regime’s imperialism, and the oppression suffered by the Slovenes and Croats living in the Kingdom of Italy as a result of the war and subject to brutal ethnic persecutions by the dictatorship.

After the atrocities committed during the invasion of Yugoslavia, the collapse of fascism and its institutions in 1943 made Venezia Giulia the object of claims by the Yugoslav national liberation movement. Violence and harassment ensued against Italians, who thus paid for the identification between Italians and fascism promoted by the regime, and for the opposition raised by the majority of the population against establishment of the socialist republic. On conclusion of the conflict, the region’s future was the first cause of friction within the anti-Nazi coalition, which decided to divide it between an Anglo-American military government and a similar Yugoslavian body, given the impossibility of reaching agreement on the territory’s

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future. Until 1954, the Italian authorities were deprived of sovereignty over Trieste, which was now separated from the Istrian hinterland and from the central European area beyond the Iron Curtain.

The allies soon included Trieste in their ‘containment’ strategy. Meanwhile, the fate of the disputed region led to a significant resurgence of national sentiment throughout the peninsula. Local clashes erupted between Italian anti-communist groups and the supporters of Yugoslavia, who formed the majority among Slovenes and the Italian working class. The pro-Italian movement adopted an ultra-patriotic stance which, although steered by the republican government and the Christian Democrats, saw Rome come to terms with the nationalist groups in the region and seek to impose an alliance between the democratic and neo-fascist components in Trieste. The ideological and national battle spread through the streets of Trieste with acts of violence on both sides. They would abate only at the end of the 1940s, with the exception of vicious brawls provoked by the Italian nationalist front in the final crises of 1952 and 1953.

In fact, the peace treaty had not contributed to reconciliation, with the consequence for Italy of the loss of Istria and the internationalization of the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT). The latter, however, was never assigned the governor that should have replaced the two military governments and reunite the areas controlled by them: first because of the growing disagreements between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviets, and second because of the breach between Tito and Stalin in June 1948, which made Belgrade a valuable interlocutor for the West. Although only a few months previously the allied tripartite declaration had promised the return of the FTT to Rome (in order to foster the emergence of the DC and De Gasperi at the eve of the first parliamentary elections in Italy), the new and unforeseen strategic need to »keep Tito afloat« meant that the United States and Great Britain began to push for the definitive division of the region between Italy and Yugoslavia accord-

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ing to the *status quo*. The Italian government, however, did not change its stance. Although in 1947 it had resumed trade relations with its Balkan neighbour, it was hostile to the latter in the name of anti-communism and resisted pressures for a bilateral agreement. It suffered the Anglo-American policy of privileging Moscow’s former satellite instead of a country belonging to NATO. It was in 1954 that the dispute was resolved by the London Memorandum, which ratified the situation that by now had consolidated.

The agreements did not remedy the animosity between the two States. There still remained ideological distances, the problem of the border, and that of the minorities. These would continue to be burdensome issues even after the first signs that the Cold War was attenuating. For example, until the mid-1960s, Italy would affirm its sovereignty over the entire FTT and the provisional nature of the Memorandum, although this interpretation had been excluded *a priori* by the allies. However, 1954 marked a turning point, which obliged Rome to begin considering adjustment to the change of scenario. It required mitigation of the contrasts between Italy and Yugoslavia and the definition of a new function for Trieste, a city which the war had assigned to a geopolitical context in which it was peripheral and downgraded, located on the margins of the Iron Curtain, and driven by the after-effects of the ideological and national struggle. It was a slow process influenced by the constant opposition raised by the Right and associations of Istrian refugees, as well as by the Triestines’ continuing sense of encirclement.

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**The dialogue between Rome and Belgrade**

The most significant steps in the updating of Italo-Yugoslav relations began in the 1960s. One of the main artificers of the thaw was undoubtedly Aldo Moro, who in that period in rapid succession held the positions of secretary of the DC, prime minister, and foreign minister. Moro termed ‘peace in security’ the contribution which he believed Rome should make to improving relations among the European states, consolidating the first forms of collaboration between the blocs, and reducing the gaps between the rich and poorer nations. The influence of ‘Democratic Catholicism’ was a determinant of the Italian international policy implemented by Moro, who maintained that new responses were needed to the processes of *détente*, emancipation, and peace ongoing worldwide. Already in the 1950s, Italy had reached

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economic accords with the socialist countries, and it sought, as far as possible, to adopt a European, and not solely bipolar, stance. Accordingly, the centre-left executives assumed a multipolar approach to international relations and acted with greater autonomy from the United States. Mediation among governments with even markedly different visions was identified as the best means to overcome ideological cleavages and power politics, resolve disputes, move towards bilateral disarmament, reaffirm the continent’s cultural unity, and strengthen cooperation with the socialist bloc, the Middle East, and the Third World. This approach had important repercussions on domestic policy as well. A shared foreign policy helped reinforce the alliance between the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party, and it later substantiated the ‘strategy of attention’ to the Communist Party launched by Moro in 1969 and favoured by the parallel evolution of the PCI’s foreign policy.

The redefinition of Italy’s international role also concerned the Adriatic Question. Once again, Moro’s policy direction was crucial, and it was applied in the frontier area by the Julian ‘Moroteans’, convinced proponents of the national leader’s line. The Moroteans had assumed control of the Triestine DC at the end of the 1950s in response to the crisis suffered by the Triestine political class after 1954. They endeavoured to make the new political direction acceptable to local public opinion, which was generally averse to détente with Yugoslavia, and indeed demanded reparations for the territorial lacerations caused by the war.

Rapprochement with the socialist countries intensified throughout the 1960s, and it received further impetus at the end of that decade from German foreign policy. In those years, Italy opened new channels for dialogue by distinguishing ideological differences and international affiliations from economic, scientific-technical, and cultural matters. Italian Ostpolitik followed the same pattern in regard to Yugoslavia, giving rise to the engagement with Belgrade’s ‘Westpolitik’ that culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Osimo in 1975. Moro’s ‘Italian doctrine for peace’

17 D’Amelio, Democristiani di confine.
affirmed a new idea of European security and national interests based on international cooperation and the security of borders. In fact, the Italo-Yugoslav agreement, reached a few months after the Conference of Helsinki, definitively resolved the territorial dispute. Moreover, it was part a border the pacification project pursued by Italy in which it negotiated with Austria in order to settle the question of Alto Adige and the terrorism campaign for south Tyrolean self-determination.

The first rapprochement between Rome and Belgrade came with the Udine Agreements to facilitate cross-border movements of goods and persons (1955) and an accord which regulated fishing in the Adriatic (1958). In the early 1960s, Italy was the first importer country of Yugoslav products and the second exporter to Yugoslavia. In the numerous exchanges of official visits that took place throughout the decade, the cooperation agreements were updated to mutual satisfaction and discussion began on issues such as disarmament, the Vietnam war, strengthening the UNO, decolonization, and development of the Third World. The centre-left cited relations with Belgrade as an example of how cohabitation with the socialist and non-aligned states could be improved. And it encouraged and materially assisted Yugoslavia’s political-economic liberalizing reforms and its active neutralism. Yugoslavia, for its part, looked with favour on the alliance between the DC and PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano, Italian Socialist Party). It now viewed the Italian minority in Istria as a bridge between peoples, and it considered Rome to be key intermediary through which to access the European Economic Market - as advocated, for that matter, by the Italian embassy in Belgrade. The good relationships were appreciated even in US diplomatic circles, and they were favoured by the resumption of contacts between Yugoslavia and the Vatican.

Despite the success of the détente process, however, the two governments long avoided discussing the provisional nature of the border and on the treatment of

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27 Bucarelli, Aldo Moro e l’Italia nella Westpolitik jugoslava, p. 115. For a review of the Yugoslav press on the days of Moro’s official visit in 1965 see Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Fondo Aldo Moro [henceforth Am], s. 1, ss. 9, b. 12, f. 215.
28 Am, s. 3, ss. 2, sss. 2, b. 27, f. 152, sf. 2, Ducci to Saragat (1964).
29 Imperato, Aldo Moro e la pace nella sicurezza, p. 102.
minorities. Hope that the dispute would be settled was expressed by the Yugoslav leaders during preparations for Moro’s official visit to Belgrade in 1965. Rome concurred in principle, but asked for graduality so that public opinion could be steered in favour of an agreement.31 Also Italian diplomacy assented, believing that renunciation of Zone B was by now inevitable. In public pronouncements, however, Italy still insisted on the provisionality of the London Memorandum. It was in 1968 that the Foreign Minister Giuseppe Medici for the first time gave full assurance of Italy’s respect for the demarcation line, thus allowing the movement of Yugoslav military contingents to the Yugoslav western borders. These latter had been made turbulent by the first centrifugal forces in the mosaic of Slav nationalities, and the inception of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty which postulated Soviet intervention in socialist countries at risk of crossing to the capitalist camp. Thereafter, several confidential attempts were made to reach agreement on the Italo-Yugoslavian border, but continuing disputes prevented the deadlock from being broken until the mid-1970s.32

Particularly difficult, for example, were the months preceding Tito’s visit to Italy in 1971,33 an initiative harshly criticised by the extreme right, by Istrian associations, and by a section of the Trieste DC fearful that it signalled possible agreement on the eastern border. In answer to parliamentary questions, Moro assured the chamber that the government was not contemplating »any surrender of legitimate national interests«,34 although he did not specify if these interests were territorial or of another kind. Tito postponed the official visit, initially scheduled for the end of 1970, accusing Rome of a covert irredentist intent.35 But this was probably a pretext: the Yugoslav leader, in fact, wanted to gain time following Italy’s refusal during meetings to commit itself explicitly to resolution of the border dispute as Belgrade had been demanding for some time.36 The Italian government considered it hazardous to render public negotiations which were still extremely delicate amid domestic political uncertainty and instability of the centre-left executives, with the risk of provoking the reaction of the nationalist right and the Julian public opinion.37 The rift between the governments of the two countries was repaired during the meeting of the foreign ministers held in Venice in February 1971 prior to Tito’s visit. On that occasion, Italy gave reassurances that it did not want to renegotiate the Memorandum’s provisions;

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31 Bucarelli, Aldo Moro e l’Italia nella Westpolitik jugoslava, pp. 141-142.
32 Bucarelli, La «questione jugoslava».
33 Ibid, pp. 53-61.
36 Archivio Diocesi di Trieste, Fondo Sergio Coloni [henceforth Ac], b. 8, f. Dc 1976, Review of the Yugoslav press.
indeed, it asked for the resumption of private talks for comprehensive solution of the last remaining issues.\textsuperscript{38}

The negotiations continued amid numerous difficulties. Yugoslavia refused to furnish a territorial \textit{quid pro quo} for recognition of its sovereignty over Zone B, while Italian diplomacy sought to obtain at least a symbolic gain. Yet another setback in 1974 provoked a hardening of positions, and Belgrade deployed troops to the border as an extreme sign of impatience and as a device to apply pressure on Italy. This final crisis induced the Italian government to clear the way for the Osimo Agreements. With Moro’s return as prime minister in November 1974, Rome therefore decided to forgo any territorial gains.\textsuperscript{39} The agreement was reached in the following year. It sanctioned the recognition of land and sea borders, the regulation of citizenship options, the inclusion of guarantees for minorities in the legislations of the two countries, and adjournment of the issue of indemnities for Italian property nationalized in Istria. Added to these were a number of economic provisions: most notably the creation of a free industrial zone spanning the border, the construction of cross-border transport infrastructures, integration of the ports of the Upper Adriatic, a project for a waterway connected to the Black Sea, and regimentation of water in Slovenia.

\textbf{The new policy line of the DC in Trieste}

At the turn of the century, the Italian population of Trieste had been prevalently liberal-national and socialist in its political culture. Catholicism - which was instead widespread among the Slovenes and Croats living in the outlying districts and the countryside - had been unable significantly to penetrate local society with its ecclesiastical and social structures.\textsuperscript{40} Given this tradition, during the post-second world war period Christian Democracy received its legitimacy, not from Catholic values shared by the electorate, but from the anti-communism and defence of national identity stemming from the commitment of the De Gasperi governments to the ‘Italianness’ of Venezia Giulia.\textsuperscript{41}

In the first post-war decade, Trieste was afflicted by strong political and national tensions, and it also suffered from a severe democratic deficit due to the cumbersome protection of the allied military government. The city emerged from this long post-war phase - which lasted precisely until 1954 - in a state of severe economic stagna-

\textsuperscript{38} Bucarelli, \textit{La «questione jugoslava»}, pp. 53-61.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., pp. 45-81.
tion, the most obvious features of which were the fragility of private enterprise, a
general contraction of production, and unemployment aggravated by the dismissals
of staff hired by the AMG. Trieste had returned to Italy, but it was eccentric to the
geography of the country. Moreover, it was situated only a few kilometres from a so-
cialist state, and its hinterland now lay largely within the orbit of the Soviet bloc. In
this situation, the enthusiasm of 1954 rapidly dwindled. It was replaced by growing
public anger at Trieste’s alleged abandonment by Rome, which had been lavish with
political propaganda in previous years but had not thought to prepare a plan for the
city’s rapid and efficacious development - certainly also because of the objective dif-
ficulties created in Trieste by the new geopolitical order that had arisen after 1945.

After the signing of the Memorandum, the leadership of the Trieste DC - the
majority of which took a conservative stance largely influenced by the events of the
period just concluded - continued to reject the ‘unjust peace’ and ‘the burning de-
feat’ of the London agreement. It reiterated the image of a citadel besieged by the
Slav fifth column, and invoking extraordinary economic measures by a government
often accused of indifference to the city’s plight. The centre, for its part, adhered
to a logic of intervention between exceptional and welfarist which continued the
special treatment enjoyed by Trieste when it had been a Habsburgian duty-free port,
and which had been reinforced under the Marshall Plan during the Anglo-American
administration. The intention of the first commercial agreements with Yugoslavia
was to stimulate cross-border trade, but they were hampered by the continuing dis-
pute between the two countries. Moreover, delays accumulated at the level of rep-
resentation, since Trieste appointed its first deputies only in 1958. Finally, problems
also arose in the relationship with the Slovenian minority, which Rome regarded as a
potentially hostile force, and whose legitimate demands were long perceived by large
sections of the city population and the local Catholic Church as an affront to the
Italian traditions of Trieste.

The standstill concerned many aspects of local life, and it was politically advanta-
geous for the ‘anti-system’ parties: the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI)
was able to leverage on anti-Slav nationalism, the Communist Party on defence of the
minority and the industrial crisis, and the diversified independentist area on frustra-
tion with the unsatisfactory responses to the economic stagnation. Support for the
DC, already well below the national average, declined throughout the 1950s. A new

**42** Crisi definitiva del Memorandum. In: La Prora, 29. 1. 1955.
43 Archivio di Stato Trieste, Archivio Dc di Trieste [henceforth Adct], b. 428, f. 953, Election
programme 1952 and b. 410, f. 873, «Schema di un programma per lo sviluppo di Trieste» (1957); La
44 All’esame del Parlamento le leggi per Trieste. In: La Prora, 10. 2. 1955; Istituto Sturzo, Archivio
DC, Segreteria politica [henceforth Asp], b. 76, f. 8, «Leggi per Trieste» (1956).
47 The DC gained its maximum votes (39.1%) in the municipal elections of 1949. Its votes de-
creased to 33% in 1952 and to 31.2% in 1956. In 1949 the parties favourable to the FTT obtained
36.4%, divided among independentists, Cominformist communists, Titoists and pro-Western Slo-
generation was then called upon to accomplish the increasingly necessary ‘change of gear’\(^{48}\) to what has been termed ‘border Catholicism’.\(^{49}\) The latter had previously been the protagonist of transition to democracy as part of the so-called ‘defence of Italianness’, which had lasted until 1954, with the outcome - through the efforts the DC and the local ecclesiastical hierarchy - of partial persistence of the political culture and ideas of Italianness that had been the heritage of the Julian liberal-national ruling class in the first half of the century. From the early 1960s onwards, border Catholicism assumed its most original form based on a proposed normalization which, it was claimed, would rescue the periphery from its isolation and economic decline. At the same time, it would resolve the national question and the ethnic tensions that had afflicted Trieste since the second half of the nineteenth century.

The new Christian Democratic leadership assumed a ‘Morotean’ stance from the outset. The Trieste DC, in fact, was one of the few provincial party sections which, from the late 1950s onwards, had expressly adopted Moro’s positions. In consonance with the development of the latter, the Julian ‘Moroteans’ took a patriotic-democratic line\(^{50}\) which envisaged the purging of nationalist detritus from Italianness, enlargement of democracy, the superseding of municipalist and localist tendencies, the beginning of dialogue with the minority, and cooperation between border regions.\(^{51}\) Thus the Italo-Yugoslav détente and that imagined for the border were welded together in a political alignment between centre and periphery.\(^{52}\)

The breakthrough was facilitated by the slackening of international tensions, the centre-left political climate in Italy, and the innovations of the Catholic movement induced by the Vatican Council II.\(^{53}\) The political pillars of the new course were the rediscovery of anti-fascism and dialogue with the PSI to isolate the Communist Party.\(^{54}\) From the national point of view, the Julian ‘Moroteans’ for the first time promoted discussion with the Slovenian liberal, Catholic, and socialist components, relinquishing all demands for revision of the border and working to strengthen trans-frontier relations. At the administrative and economic level, they concentrated on the opportunities furnished by the autonomous region with special status, and the

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\(^{48}\) Adct, b. 32, ff. 799-800, Provincial congress 1957.


\(^{50}\) Le valutazioni della Dc sulla situazione politica a Trieste. In: Il Popolo giuliano, 1. 12. 1962.


\(^{52}\) D’Amelio, Democristiani di confine.


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revival of Trieste’s industry and the harbour with public capital.\footnote{La Democrazia cristiana per lo sviluppo di Trieste. In: La Prora, 12. 2. 1958.} These measures would contribute to creating the ‘bridge border’, as defined by its inventors. The design was based on the logic of integration, the purpose being to foster loyalty to the state in groups which had been reluctant to grant it, such as socialists, separatists, and Slovenians.\footnote{Milica Kacin Wohinz, Jože Pirjevec: Zgodovina Slovencev v Italiji. Ljubljana 2000; Claus Gatteringer: In lotta contro Roma. Cittadini, minoranze e autonomie in Italia. Bolzano 1999.} It was a radical rethinking of the function of the eastern border and of Trieste. The latter was conceived and proposed as the capital of a central European region straddling the blocs of the Cold War. It was to be a city of peace and a crossroads of international relations, constructed through the superseding of the border policy that had hitherto blocked any possibility of expansion; a city which would become a flourishing hub of industry and services based on state-owned enterprises, harbour facilities, and international research centres.\footnote{Adct, b. 377, f. 905, Administrative elections programme 1966; Rinnovato impegno per la funzione europea di Trieste. In: Il Popolo del Friuli Venezia Giulia, 30. 6. 1967; La grande Trieste degli anni ‘70. In: Il Popolo del Friuli Venezia Giulia, 11. 4. 1968.}

Normalization began on the eve of the general elections of 1958, when parliament enacted a law to augment the docks and infrastructural connections with Italy and Central Europe,\footnote{Il testo della legge dei 45 miliardi. In: La Prora, 23. 3. 1958.} added to which were assurances of new orders for the Finmare shipyards and expansion of the Ilva steelworks.\footnote{Nuove confortanti prospettive per l’avvenire di Trieste. In: La Prora, 15. 3. 1960.} The measures were announced as a programme for the definitive relaunch of Trieste,\footnote{Adct, b. 9, f. 807 e b. 36, f. 806, Provincial congress 1962.} but much of the work would only be completed in the 1980s, two decades after the initial pledges. The interventions were responses to the demand for an integral free-trade zone (which had existed under the Habsburgs) advanced by all parties and economic categories. It had been supported after 1954 by the DC;\footnote{Stefano Balestra: La questione della Zona franca nel dibattito politico a Trieste fra il 1954 e il 1958. In: Quaderni del Centro studi economico-politici Ezio Vanoni, no. 1-2, 2001.} but the party’s new leadership soon distanced itself from the project, deeming it outdated and in conflict with the principles of the European Common Market.\footnote{Occorre attirare a Trieste capitali d’investimento industriale. In: La Prora, 15. 3. 1959.} Nevertheless, the DC continued to apply pressure for special measures. It obtained the concession of franchises for the industrial sector, and it sought to have Trieste recognized as a depressed area, with reductions in the cost of fuel and tax relief on harbour work.\footnote{Asp, b. 131, f. 1, «Schema di legge per lo sviluppo industriale» (1959); Una politica di sviluppo per il porto di Trieste e Interventi per i Crda sollecitati alla Camera. In: Il Popolo giuliano, 1. 10. 1963; Disco verde all’Ente porto. In: Il Popolo del Friuli Venezia Giulia, 16. 12. 1965.} Added to these were the appointment to jobs in the public administration of thousands of surplus personnel, including Istrian exiles and former employees of the AMG.\footnote{Inserimento degli ex Gma nelle strutture statali. In: Il Popolo giuliano, August 1961.}
last of the five special statute regions envisaged by the Italian constitution. For the Julian ‘Moroteans’, it was an important power centre, a symbol of autonomy, and, thanks to ample financial resources, a key means to develop the area and thus blunt the weapons of municipalism. Establishment of the special-statute region would also enhance the political connection with traditionally Catholic Friuli, which was crucial for reinforcing the fragile position of the Trieste Catholics, and on a larger scale, reducing the influence of communists, Slovenians, and independentists. Finally, the region would be a platform for maintaining relations with neighbouring countries and discussing issues relative to the frontier with the government. Trieste was chosen as the region’s capital after long negotiations with Udine, and it could also count on full control over management of the port and additional financial resources. However, these represented a compromise with respect to the broad provincial autonomy initially envisaged by the DC. The special statute was approved in 1963, after a gestation period of almost five years, during which recognition of decentralization was delayed by the fragility of neo-centrist governments, impediments within the national DC, and long-drawn-out negotiations between Trieste and Friuli on how the new institution was to be structured.

The appointment of representatives in Rome and establishment of the region made the ‘Moroteans’ into mediators between the centre and the frontier. Albeit with influence limited by the marginality of a peripheral and sparsely populated area, the leadership of the Trieste DC became a ‘political entrepreneur’ through leverage of state holdings and regional financial instruments. The centre-left thus sought to off-set the inaction of private initiative narcotized by years of welfare dependency and unwilling to invest in a difficult geopolitical scenario. In the late 1960s, the Region also began to define, as far as it was permitted to do so, its own foreign policy - a local variant of ‘peace in security’ - whose aim was to make Friuli Venezia Giulia a linkage among Italy, the Balkans, and Central Europe. Local agreements were concluded with Slovenia in many sectors of the economy and culture. They would

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68 *La Dc per il progresso sociale, economico e politico di Trieste.* In: La Prora, 11. 5. 1957.
71 *Il programma della Dc per il Friuli Venezia Giulia.* In: Il Popolo del Friuli Venezia Giulia, 7. 4. 1964; Am, s. 1, ss. 12, b. 19, f. 421, Discorsi in occasione della visita di esponenti jugoslavi (1968); s. 1, ss. 13, b. 13, f. 473, Discorso agli eletti negli enti locali del Fvg (1969); *Jugoslavia e Italia.* In: Il Popolo, 1. 10. 1969.
be followed by the Treaty of Osimi and creation of the Alpe Adria Community, a body that after 1978 provided occasions for informal discussions among Friuli Venezia Giulia, Slovenia and Carinthia, and which would be subsequently joined by other Italian, Austrian, German and Hungarian regions. The integration promoted by the association enabled Slovenia to avoid the isolation suffered by other societies under socialist regimes: as testified by the pressure exerted by the Region in 1991 for recognition of Slovenia and Croatia’s independence, despite the waverings of the Italian government, which was initially interested in the Yugoslav federation’s survival.

The difficulties of the new political course

Rapprochement with Slovenes was one of the pillars of the Julian centre-left’s policy. But the constatation of the new political alliance was more complex in Trieste than, elsewhere because of the connections that the PCI and the PSI continued to maintain in some of the province’s municipalities, and because of the presence within the PSI of former Titoist militants, who had joined the party in the early 1960s. The centre-left accords between the DC and the PSI also involved the Slovenian democratic groups, although the Memorandum had not dispelled the mistrust of the minority, which would repeatedly complain about its unfair treatment by the Christian Democrats and the government commissariat, an extraordinary body created to harmonize after 1959 Trieste’s incorporation into the legislation and institutional functions of the Italian state. The representatives of the Slovenian political groups criticised, for example, Italy’s refusal to grant Yugoslav’s (justified) request for the use of Slovene in the public administration and in the courts, excessive police controls, the restoration of a fascist law which forbade the giving of foreign names to children, and the expropriation of plots of land settled by Slovenes for the construction of houses for Istrian refugees. These, in fact, were ambiguous responses to the Slovenian economic and cultural penetration feared by the Italians, in a scenario where the ‘Moroteans’ considered openness to the minority a concrete threat to the DC’s political solidity. At the same time, however, the proponents of the new Christian Democrat policy sought to consolidate in parliament the position of minority teaching staff and the vitality of the Slovenian non-communist cultural organiza-

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78 Asp, b. 135, f. 4, Report by the government commissariat on the national problem at the eastern border (1960); b. 134, f. 3 Belci to Moro (1960); b. 137, f. 6, Belci to Moro (1961).
tions excluded from funding by Ljubljana and Belgrade. Although with the caution dictated by the circumstances, the DC’s new strategy endeavoured to replace the national contraposition with a mere political distinction, so that at least part of the minority would reject the ethnic unity constantly proposed by the left wing of the Slovenes in Trieste minority. The dialogue - previously extolled but never pursued by the De Gasperi ruling class - took place mainly with political parties, rather than with Slovenes in Trieste society itself. The DC, in fact, did not address any explicit propaganda to the Slovenes resident in the region, probably in order not to provoke protests by the most reactionary part of its electorate.

On the other hand, the reactions to the new strategy for the frontier’s normalization would demonstrate the soundness of the ‘Morotean’ secretariat’s fears, since it had to deal with three crucial episodes in the space of a decade. The first was the creation in 1965 of the ‘organic’ centre-left with the entry into the city council of a Slovenian socialist, formerly a supporter of Trieste’s annexation to Yugoslavia. The debate in the city consequently once again centred on the opposition between ‘Italy’ and ‘anti-Italy’. The nationalist right staged protests and collected tens of thousands of signatures against ‘Slav’ entry into the city council, two Christian Democrat assessors resigned, and hostility was voiced within the centrist area of the party and a substantial section of the electorate. Finally, the bishop of Trieste publicly called for the resignation of the ‘Morotean’ executive and urged a formal disavowal - never forthcoming - by the ecclesial movements belonging to Azione Cattolica.

As we have seen, the national factor had been the DC’s prime source of support; and the same mechanism continued to operate even after 1954, when refugees from Zone B flowed into Trieste. They strengthened the DC’s Catholic base and reinforced the national and anti-communist thrust which was one of the main reasons for the party’s popularity. The exiles looked to the DC because of its pre-eminent position in the Italian political system, because of the Istrian origin of many of its

79 Ac, b. 6, f. Viaggio Jugoslavia 1972, Memorandum to Prime Minister Colombo; b. 7, f. Politica, rapporti Italia - Jugoslavia, minoranza 1974, «Tutela globale».
80 I titini privilegiati a danno dei cattolici. In: La Prora, 23. 2. 1957; Adct, b. 85, f. 903, Letter from the provincial secretary to members (1964).
81 See e.g. La visita del presidente Moro a Trieste. In: Il Popolo, 7. 5. 1964; La Dc per la difesa degli ideali democratici. In: Il Popolo, 9. 5. 1964.
82 Adct, b. 11, f. 382, Botteri to Bartoli (1965); L’alleanza con gli sloveni nelle giunte vivacemente criticata all’interno della Dc. In: Il Piccolo, 27. 1. 1965. The position of the Triestine centrists was in contradiction with the approval of the operation expressed by national leaders of the centrist faction like Oscar Luigi Scalfaro and Mario Scelba.
leaders, because of the Catholicism that united the party with most of the refugees, and because of its welfarist and political remedies found - not without forms of clien-
telism85 - for the exiles’ urgent material needs.86 The refugees reversed the downward
trend in the DC’s electoral support, but they did not do so by virtue of the openness
of the ‘Moroteans’. In short, some of the DC’s voters, Istrian or otherwise, continued
to resort to the party because of previous pressures, thereby generating a departure
from the new policy line.87

The second crisis occurred in 1966 as a reaction to the restructuring of the state-
owned enterprises located in Trieste. For some years, the city had shown signs of
economic recovery, but its decline was far from over.88 Amid the world crisis in ship-
building, the Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning (Comitato Inter-
ministeriale di Programmazione Economica, CIPE) was urged by the EEC to ration-
alize the Italian naval engineering.89 The CIPE consequently drew up a plan for the
concentration of production that would close the shipyard in Trieste to the benefit
of the one in nearby Monfalcone. This was a severe blow to a glorious but declining
tradition, and after gruelling negotiations with Rome, the Julian DC managed to
obtain some concessions.90 However, the new proposal did not avert the population's
violent reaction to measures which, while promising to maintain employment
levels in the state-owned enterprises, symbolized the crisis and Italy’s indifference
to ’Trieste’s downgrading’.91 At the beginning of the 1970s, the DC nevertheless
declared that the economic transition had been accomplished.92 But the proclamations
claiming stabilization of ’Trieste’s economic situation clashed with confidential brief-
ings which expressed the Triestines’ concern about the worsening situation and the
continuing delays in the construction of transport and harbour infrastructures.93

From the point of view of electoral support, the DC was little affected by the dif-
ficulties that exploded - the first for national-political reasons, the second for socio-
economic ones - in 1965 and 1966. This evidently persuaded the provincial secre-
ratariat that the party had been left unscathed by first shocks of normalization.94 In

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85 Asp, b. 2, f. 10, Resolution of the provincial committee (1948); see also the welfare measures in
Adct, b. 13, f. 608; b. 14, f. 619; b. 55, f. 316; b. 410, f. 875.
87 D’Amelio, Democristiani di confine.
90 Adct, b. 312, f. 843, Ufficio progetti Crda; b. 314, f. 851, Botteri to Piccoli (1966); Trieste
Il Popolo del Friuli Venezia Giulia, 7. 3. 1968.
93 Asp, b. 137, f. 6, Belci to Moro (1961); b. 206, f. 6, Provincial committee to the government
and the national secretariat (1972).
subsequent years, the party centred its public discourse on the theme of the ‘bridge border’ in order to prepare the ground for settlement of the dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia.\(^{95}\) In 1969, the misgivings of Julian public opinion in regard to détente with the Slavic bloc did not prevent the regional DC from starting direct dialogue with the political leaders of Slovenia,\(^{96}\) and in the following year the DC took a firm stand against a worrying resurgence of nationalism - an attack on young Slovenians and the explosion of a bomb in the centre of Trieste - by joining an anti-fascist march which for the first time saw the party’s banners paraded alongside red flags and bilingual placards.\(^{97}\)

Although the Julian ‘Moroteans’ agreed in principle with pacification of the border, they nevertheless stalled Rome’s initiative by repeatedly asking for postponement of the Italo-Yugoslav negotiations on definition of the demarcation line, which the government instead wanted to conclude as soon as possible.\(^{98}\) The local Christian Democrat press never gave information about the official visits that Italy and Yugoslavia exchanged during the 1960s; and not even Tito’s journey to Rome was reported, although the regional DC urged resumption of the meeting after the disputes that had led to its postponement.\(^{99}\) At the end of 1971 the presidency of the Region explicitly endorsed the structure envisaged by the London Memorandum\(^ {100}\) but only ten days previously the Trieste DC secretariat had persuaded the party’s central executive to deny its intention to cede Zone B.\(^ {101}\) The ‘go-ahead’ was given only in 1973.\(^ {102}\) The Trieste ‘Moroteans’, moreover, had to take account of the internal opposition - led by the neo-centrist and ‘Fanfanian’ factions - which had grown significantly because of its defence of the principle of sovereignty over Zone B, its coldness towards Adriatic détente, and its rejection of dialogue with the Italian Communist Party.

The Treaty of Osimo was concluded in 1975. In the parliamentary debate requested by the government before the final signature, the executive presented the agreement as a painful but realistic concession necessary to erase the legacy of the fascist war and to consolidate the frontier’s security.\(^ {103}\) According to Prime Minister Mariano Rumor and Foreign Minister Moro, Osimo would give legal certainty to the border arrangement, thus improving bilateral relations and protecting the two countries’ respective minorities, in a situation that had become ‘non-modifiable by


\(^{96}\) Ac, b. 4, f. Democrazia cristiana 1971, Meeting between the Dc and the Workers’ Alliance, and Visit to Fiume by a Triestine delegation; b. 10, f. Alpe Adria 1979.

\(^{97}\) _Per la pace nella libertà_. In: Il Popolo del Friuli Venezia Giulia, 8. 1. 1971.


\(^{101}\) Asp, b. 202, f. 3, Coloniti to Forlani (1971).


\(^{103}\) Atti parlamentari, Camera dei deputati, VI legislatura, seduta del 1 ottobre 1975, pp. 23599-23611; _Realismo_. In: Il Popolo, 2. 10. 1975.
either force or consent’. Finally, the treaty would help maintain Yugoslavia’s integrity and independence. Italy would thus no longer be exposed on its eastern border, but instead protected, and with a consequent solid prospect of ‘Adriatic peace’. The parliamentary discussion registered the unenthusiastic reaction of the Christian Democrat Amintore Fanfani, although he eventually voted in favour of the motion.\(^\text{104}\) In the past, Fanfani’s neo-Atlanticism had frequently outstripped Moro’s prudence in foreign policy.\(^\text{105}\) By contrast, Fanfani had on several occasions taken an inflexible stance on Yugoslavia by making dialogue conditional on solution of the border dispute.\(^\text{106}\) On the occasion, cleavages within the Trieste DC were manifested in the positions taken by its parliamentary deputies.\(^\text{107}\) The Triestine ‘Morotean’ Corrado Belci was symbolically chosen to cast the parliamentary group’s vote in favour, while the ‘Fanfanian’ Bologna delivered a speech harshly critical of the agreement. He inveighed against the political and economic value of Belgrade’s concession, the vain illusion of Yugoslavia’s solidity after Tito’s departure, and the wrongness of the damage caused to Italy’s alleged right to sovereignty over Zone B.\(^\text{108}\) However, almost all the parliamentarin’s voted in favor of the Osimo agreement.

The parliamentary debate took place in a semi-deserted chamber, which testified to the marginality of the eastern border question in the political debate of those years. With the exception of the right, all parties approved the government’s actions with a substantial unanimity of historical judgement that was also shared by the press.\(^\text{109}\) For the first time, the Italian Communists supported a foreign policy action by the government,\(^\text{110}\) and Enrico Berlinguer emphasised the importance of a vote that had united the democratic and anti-fascist parties.\(^\text{111}\) On 10 November 1975, the signing of the Osimo Treaty passed almost unnoticed by Italian public opinion, now far removed from the passions aroused by the national reaction to the peace treaty: the only protests of some vehemence were voiced by the exiles\(^\text{112}\) and by part of public opinion in Trieste, where a political earthquake occurred.

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\(^{104}\) *Un’amara ma responsabile rinuncia.* In: Il Popolo, 10. 10. 1975.


\(^{107}\) Atti parlamentari, Camera dei deputati, VI legislatura, seduta del 1 ottobre 1975, pp. 23679-23682; Atti parlamentari, Camera dei deputati, VI legislatura, seduta del 2 ottobre 1975, pp. 23731-23736.


\(^{110}\) Atti parlamentari, Camera dei deputati, VI legislatura, seduta del 2 ottobre 1975, p. 23724-23731; Atti parlamentari, Camera dei deputati, VI legislatura, seduta del 3 ottobre 1975, pp. 23833-23835.


In fact, the Treaty of Osimo hit the Trieste DC’s support very hard indeed. After the tensions of 1965-1966, new cleavages opened up in the party, the electorate, the Catholic movement and Istrian exiles.\textsuperscript{113} The agreement ratified a surrender of territory which was in fact only formal, but whose symbolic significance caused an explosion of protest precisely as the final step in the Adriatic’s normalization was in progress. In Trieste, neo-fascist groups rioted, and a local branch of the DC was attacked with petrol bombs.\textsuperscript{114} The frustration of the Right and the exiles added to that of broad sections of local society disappointed by the economic compensations received by Italy as a corollary to the Osimo Treaty; compensations, for that matter, never discussed in advance with local representatives, and which subsequently remained almost entirely unrealized. The government had considered the creation of an industrial free zone on both Italian and Slovenian territory as the main indemnity to be offered at the border; but the more advantageous proposal initially made by Italian diplomacy - location of the zone entirely on Slovenian territory - was discarded in the course of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{115} The Julian industrialists had strong reservations about the zone, while the local newspaper \textit{Il Piccolo} depicted a Trieste humiliated in its national feelings and economic interests, amid the general indifference of the rest of the country.\textsuperscript{116}

The Treaty of Osimo catalysed an opposition front consisting of diverse nationalist, autonomist, anti-partitocratic, and environmentalist groups. The periphery was opposed to the centre, and in less than a year 65,000 signatures were collected in support of the establishment of an integral duty-free zone in unlikely imitation of the free port created at the time of the Austrian Empire.\textsuperscript{117} As has often happened in recent Julian history, discontent translated into refuge in the mythical past glories of the Habsburg age, to which the local DC opposed a rigid defence of its actions.\textsuperscript{118} Only in subsequent years did the provincial secretariat admit to having failed to understand the underlying reasons for the protest.\textsuperscript{119} The implications of the latter produced an alliance between socialists and liberals who left their respective parties and opened a new political phase through the creation of a long-standing movement of localist opinion called \textit{Lista per Trieste} (LPT).\textsuperscript{120}

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119 Ac, b. 10, f. Democrazia cristiana 1979, Speech by the secretary to the provincial committee; b. 12, f. Democrazia cristiana 1980, Motion 1 of the 32nd provincial congress.

The ‘Moroteans’ branded the LPT a reaction of the Julian bourgeoisie - nationalist and isolationist - against the Christian Democrat’s popular project;\textsuperscript{121} but it was the DC itself that split between proponents and detractors of Osimo.\textsuperscript{122} In Trieste, support for the DC waned, and just over a month after the death of Moro, Trieste ‘Moroteism’ fell victim to disastrous election results.\textsuperscript{123} After thirty years, in 1978 the party lost control of the municipality, and in the following year had only one candidate - inimical to the provincial secretariat - elected to parliament.\textsuperscript{124} Thus began the rise of the LPT, a phenomenon that caught the attention of the national press.\textsuperscript{125} The LPT captured votes from all the other political alliances, and for a decade was the leading party in the city. It exploited the theme of the ill-treated periphery, the demand for administrative autonomy (though combined with further exemptions and special concessions), the reaction of the exiles, distrust in the political system, and the coolness of a largely conservative electorate towards dialogue between the DC and PCI. The legacy of municipalism and national liberalism resurfaced in new form, after a period of subordination that had evidently not undermined the reasons for its existence.\textsuperscript{126}

\textbf{Results and failures}

As we have seen, the good neighbourliness policy between Italy and Yugoslavia - inaugurated in the second half of the 1950s and significantly expanded not only by the Italian centre-left but also by the new policy direction taken by the Yugoslav state in the 1960s - came about through resolution of the dispute on the FTT and the frontier. The issue contained elements of great delicacy for both governments, but it had more problematic implications in Italy, due to the constant pressure applied by the nationalist right, by broad segments of Trieste public opinion, and by the Istrian refugee associations, in a period of growing instability for the centre-left governments.\textsuperscript{127} The negotiations on the demarcation line long remained confidential;

\textsuperscript{123} The Dc obtained 26% of votes in the municipal election and 23.7% in the general election. The municipal elections of 1982 saw the party receive only 19.3%, while the result of 1983 was again 23.7%.
\textsuperscript{127} Am, s. 1, ss. 21, b. 33, f. 728, Statement by Moro to Yugoslav television, 24. 2. 1977.
indeed, their existence was frequently denied, with increasing embarrassment, by the successive governments in Rome.\textsuperscript{128}

The centre-left was well aware of the profound misgivings in Trieste and the simmering resentment of the exiles; but Yugoslav pacification was now imposed by the international context, which required the government to move forward even at the cost of provoking local hostility. Rome therefore succeeded in its operations of more far-reaching consequence: normalization of the Adriatic Question, conciliation with Yugoslavia’s ‘Westpolitik’, and the establishment of good relations with the countries that inherited its legacy.

What was lacking, however, was normalization of the periphery. The Julian centre-left had advanced a new political and national proposal, but it was insufficient to overcome long-standing cultural attitudes. Although presented as a foreign policy success by the centre-left, the Treaty of Osimo dealt a fatal blow to the Christian Democrats of Trieste. The party’s support - fragile because it rested mainly on national claims and not traditional Catholic identity, as in many ‘white’ cultural areas of the country - had begun to collapse for some time since the phase of shared decisions on the first economic measures taken after 1954, establishment of the Region, and assistance to refugees. The centre-left’s political and national options, and constant delays in the implementation of development measures, were insurmountable obstacles to maintenance of the DC’s solidity. The crises that erupted at local level were indicative of the deep-lying difficulties of ‘border Catholicism’ in generating political and economic progress in Trieste society, partly because of the complex geopolitical context in which the city had been included as a result of the Second World War. Moreover, the DC was beginning to decline throughout Italy. It was weakened by the attrition of the centre-left, dialogue with the Communist Party, the consociational management of public affairs, and the end of political unity among Catholics due to the breakdown of collateralism, defeat in the referendum on divorce, and the impact of youth protest.

The shock caused by the Treaty of Osimo brought the contradictions accumulated over the years into the open. It demonstrated that three decades of the DC’s presence had not penetrated into the soul of Trieste, nor rooted in the latter the new Italian frontier identity proposed by the centre-left elite. Hitherto, the DC’s design had been able to incorporate the forces that, for different reasons, were potential risks to the system’s solidity: the patriotic middle class, exiles, the socialists, and the Slovenes. However, the integration came about mainly at the level of the ruling classes, and it did not correspond to full assimilation of the competing local political cultures. The party thus found itself severely exposed with the return of previous traditions: on the one hand, nationalism reinforced by the persistence of the dichotomy

between ‘Italy’ and ‘anti-Italy’ well beyond 1954; on the other, the municipalism fuelled by disappointment with Trieste’s economic downgrading and the consequent distrust of Rome.129

The priorities of the electorate remained unchanged over time, crystallized by the absence of the community’s socio-economic development. The increasing commercial relations between Italy and Yugoslavia did not bring special benefits to the border area, which did not find a locus within the new relations with the Balkans, although the cross-border traffic - exemplified by the development of trade specifically aimed at the Yugoslav shoppers who thronged the city in the late 1970s and early 1980s - was nevertheless important in stimulating openness among a considerable part of Julian public opinion, so that it was easier to reach broader agreements. However, around a quarter of the Trieste electorate regarded the Treaty of Osimo as yet another concession made in exchange for nothing. For many Triestines, abdication of the unattainable return to Zone B, the secret conduct of the negotiations, and the treaty’s economic repercussions marked the final betrayal of the mission which the state and the Christian Democrats should have pursued in regard to the frontier areas.

The ceding of Zone B assumed the significance of a further payment demanded after the loss of Istria; and the economic recompenses were never realized, partly because of Belgrade’s increasing financial difficulties, and partly because of the explosion of protest by the Lista per Trieste. This was not merely a nationalist and municipalist reaction. In certain respects, it anticipated the general loss of support by the traditional parties and the emergence of an anti-centralist and localist tendency of which Trieste was in some sense a forerunner, and which would exert its full effect with the emergence of northernist political parties in Italy able to take advantage of the crisis of credibility that Italian politics would suffer in the 1980s.130

The strategy of Adriatic normalization conducted by the centre-left in the 1960s and 1970s, however, did not concern solely the frontier, although, obviously, the latter was directly involved in the détente that culminated in the Treaty of Osimo. In fact, the agreement, and the long thaw of relations which preceded it, affected both the international and domestic levels. The accord of 1975 was an act of realism and an important contribution by Italian Ostpolitik to European détente. Osimo formally sanctioned the friendship between Rome and Belgrade, although Italy’s endeavour to relaunch its economic, political, and cultural presence in the Adriatic area was hampered by the delay with which the agreement was signed with respect to evolu-

tion of the international scenario and the internal arrangements of the two states.\textsuperscript{131} Although the government had spoken of 'year zero' in Adriatic relations,\textsuperscript{132} tensions between the blocs in the second half of the 1970s would in fact induce Rome to assume a more assertive Atlanticism. The Treaty of Osimo thus in a certain sense lost its function of exemplifying the thaw in relations with the socialist bloc. Indeed, it was superseded by the agreements reached in the meantime between Yugoslavia and the European Community.\textsuperscript{133} Moreover, the treaty did not lead to the desired strengthening of Yugoslavia, which had already begun to manifest the ethnic and economic disintegration which would accelerate after Tito’s death.\textsuperscript{134} Italy thus lost its partner in a policy intended to restore the role of a medium regional power to the peninsula, even if the agreements undoubtedly gave impetus to the achievement of lasting and important forms of cooperation among the regions of the Central European area.
mulama »mir v varnosti« in »meja - most«. Ti formuli sta odražali željo, da bi osnovali sodelovanje s Titovo Jugoslavijo in da bi začrtaли novo politično, gospodarsko in nacionalno funkcijo od središča države oddaljenega območja, kot je bila Furlanija-Julijjska krajina, katere državna pripadnost je bila vrsto predmet nasprotujočih se zahtev in ki je močno občutila posledice druge svetovne vojne. Vrhunec te politike so bili Osimski sporazumi iz leta 1975, podpis katerih je za njegove pobudnike imel tako pozitivne kot negativne posledice.

Trenja med tam živečimi narodi so se začela v zadnjem obdobju habsburške monarhije in se okrepla zaradi posledic prve svetovne vojne ter italijanske uprave, ki je bila vzpostavljena potem, ko je ob koncu prve svetovne vojne, novembra 1918, Italija to območje zasedla in ga nato dve leti kasneje z rapalško pogodbo tudi priključila. Fašistični režim, ki je oktobra 1922 v Italiji prevzel oblast, je bil avtor dolgoletnega preoblikovanja slovanskih manjšin in raznarodovalnega poskusa, ki sta mednacionalno sovražno še bolj razvnela. Napetosti so se še povečale zaradi italijanske okupacije dela Jugoslavije in nasilja italijanskih oblasti med njo, pa tudi nasilja med jugoslovansko zasedbo Istre, Trsta in Gorice. Tej je sledil krčeviti politični in mednacionalni boj, v ozadju katerega je bil negotovi izid pogajanj o mirovni pogodbi med Italijo in zavezniškimi ter pridruženimi silami in v njihovem okviru tudi vprašanje novih meja.


Le nekaj let po Londonskemu memorandumu, ki je bil odbiven vodili politiki, ki so se skupaj spremenile, kar je državama omogočilo, da sta odprli novo odbojbo v odnosih med državami na obeh straneh Jadran. Italija in Jugoslavija sta takoj po podpisu spomenke okrepili trgovinske odnose, a so obenem italijanska vlada v tržaški politiki sodelovala z Jugoslavijo. V šestdesetih in prvi polovici sedemdesetih let pa je prišlo do popuščanja napetosti, ki je svoj vrh doseglo z zaključkom spora glede meje leta 1975.

Zavezništvo med Krščansko demokracijo in Socialistično stranko Italije v okviru t. i. leve sredine je privelo do postopnega utrjevanja nove italijanske »Ostpolitik«, katere cilj je bilo izboljšanje odnosov z državami socialističnega bloka in z neuskromenimi državami. Na to politiko je s simpatijami gledala tudi Komunistična politika. Želja za javnosti, naj bi se odprla nova odbojba v odnosih med državami na obeh straneh Jadran. Italija in Jugoslavija sta takoj po podpisu spomenke okrepili trgovinske odnose, a so obenem italijanska vlada v tržaški politiki sodelovala z Jugoslavijo. V šestdesetih in prvi polovici sedemdesetih let pa je prišlo do popuščanja napetosti, ki je svoj vrh doseglj z zaključkom spora glede meje leta 1975.

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Medtem ko je na obeh straneh Jadran zavladalo ozračje novega zaupanja in je italijanska vlada odnose z Jugoslavijo prikazovala kot zgleden primer dobrih odnosov med dvema državama z različno družbeno ureditvijo, je v Trstu nov vodilni politični razred te formulje uvajal v lokalno sceno. Zamislil si je novo vlogo Trsta in razvil politični načrt, ki je bil usmerjen v to, da bi mestu pripeljal iz gospodarskega in političnega zgoraj, v katerem se je znašlo v povojnem času, pa tudi po vrnitvi italijanskih oblasti leta 1954. V sodobni tržaški Krščanske demokracije so se uveljavili novi politiki, ki so sprejeli...
Morovo usmeritev in nasledili dotedanje politične osebnosti. T e so bile preveč navezane na revanšistične in neoiredentistične teze nacionalnega boja in politika Krščanske demokracije v Trstu do tedaj ni te- 

meljila na katoliških vrednotah, ampak na obrambi italijanstva, na zmanjšanju »slovanske nevarnosti«, 
aupravne probleme.

Nova generacija krščanskodemokratskih politikov se je morala soočiti s težavno geopolitično ume-

Stitivijo Trsta, ki sta ga prizadela tako odseleavanje kot brezposelnost, ki je šele leta 1958 v italijanski 

parlament lahko izvolili svoje predstavnike in ki je bil prepričan, da ga je v Rimu prepustila go-

spodskemu parlamentu, saj so bili načrti za razvoj mesta realizirani z več desetletno zamudo. Takšne 

okoliščine so pomemben del političnega prostora prepuščale opozicijskim strankam, kar se je odražalo v 

radikalizaciji tržaške Komunistične partije Italije, indipendentističnih sil in nacionalistične desnica, pa 
tudi v stalnem padcu podpore Krščanski demokraciji v primerjavi s tisto, ki jo je ta imela v petdesetih 

letih.

Novo krščanskodemokratsko vodstvo je stavilo na preseganje »obrambe italijanstva« in tako odprlo 
pot do normalizacije številnih ciljev: konec izolacije Trsta, boj z lokalizmom, v imenu demokratičnega 
patriotizma in antinacionalizma prenehati za razvoj mesta realizirani z več desetletno zamudo. Tako 

so bili preveč navezane na revanšistične in neoiredentistične teze nacionalnega boja in politika Krščanske demokracije v Trstu do tedaj ni temeljila na katoliških vrednotah, ampak na obrambi italijanstva, na zmanjšanju »slovanske nevarnosti«, na protikomunizmu in na povezavah z italijanskimi vladami ter tako v ozadju puščala gospodarska

vprašanja in upravne probleme.

Ta politični načrt je v lokalnem javnem mnenju doživel številne kritike. Predmet mnogih obtožb 

in protestov desnice in združenj istrskih ezulov je bilo približevanje Slovencem, kar je razdelilo tudi 

traške katolike in tudi tajške slovanske manjšine. Čeprav so bili protesti proti načrtom preureditve tamkajšnjega ladjedelništva, ki so se iz cone B STO naselili v Trstu, podporo katerih je ohranjala kot stranka s katoliško 
kulturo, a tudi s klientelističnim vodenjem njihovih organizacij in podporami in se je tako ohranjalo 

sovraštvo ter protislovanska in protikomunistična čustva številnih od teh ezulov. V šestdesetih letih je 

tako prišlo do razkola med vodstvom in strankino bazo, ki se je z vso svojo resnostjo pokazal ob podpisu Osimskih sporazumov.

Osimski sporazumi so bili vrhunec popuščanja napetosti med Italijo in Jugoslavijo. Italijanske vlade 

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formalen pristanek na odpoved ozemlja, so sporazumi sprožili eksplozijo dotedanjih nasprotij; z ene strani so sprožili doneče proteste desnice in istrskih ezulov, ki so bili še vedno pretirano občutljivi za nacionalna in ozemeljska vprašanja; z druge strani je sprožil frustracije velikega števila Tržačanov zaradi razočaranja nad nerešenim zatonom mesta, ki so ga Osinski sporazumi skusali razrešiti z gospodarskimi ukrepi, za katere so številni Tržačani menili, da so zlohotni in o katerih oblasti v Rimu z lokalno skupnostjo niso nikoli razpravljale. V podporo takrat že nemogočemu predlogu o integralni prostocarinski coni, ki je bila nejasni spomin na čase habsburške monarhije, je bilo zbranih več deset tisoč podpisov. Protest v mestu je bil večplasten; vključeval je liberalce, socialiste, radikale, okoljevarstvenike, ezule in nacionaliste. Sprožil je dolgotrajno protestno gibanje - Listo za Trst -, ki je odtegnila podporo vsem tradicionalnim političnim silam in pri vođenju mesta za kratek čas spodrinila Krščansko demokracijo. Ta nova politična formacija, ki je bila lokalna in protistrankarska, ki je znala usmerjati jezo proti padanju periferije, je bila menila, da Italija, ki si jo je tako želela, z njo ravna slabo, ki se je torej počutila izdano v svojih nacionalnih vrednotah in onemogočena, da bi se vrnila v čase, ko je povojna geopolitiki dejansko bila le še spomin na daljno preteklost, je torej premagala katoliško stranko.

Leva sredina je poskusila spremeniti podobo meje, tako da je obsošila nacionalizem prve polovice dvajsetega stoletja in ciljala na to, da bi »obrambo italijanstva«, ki so jo zasledovali po koncu druge svetovne vojne, zamenjala s popuščanjem napetosti. Na mednarodni ravni je ta načrt uspel, saj je zagotavljal sodelovanje z Beogradom in na svoj način prispel k procesu popuščanja napetosti v Evropi: uspeh je bil za Italijo vsekakor le delen, saj zaradi izginost Jugoslavije ni mogla uresničiti svoje politike na območju Jadranja. Jugoslavija je se namreč od konca sedemdesetih let soočala s korenitimi političnimi, gospodarskimi in mednacionalnimi težavami, ki so izbruhnile kmalu po Titovi smrti: ob tem pa je treba poudariti, da je implozijo jugoslovanskega sistema deloma omililo - zlasti kar zadeva Slovenijo - prav prejšnje zblžanje med območjem Balkana in zahodno Evropo, zaradi katerega je lahko oživelo čezmešno sodelovanje, kakršno je potekalo npr. v okviru skupnosti Alpe-Adria. Načrt popuščanja napetosti pa je propadel v tistem delu, ko je s političnim in nacionalnim programom, ki je bil naprednejši od prejšnjih, skusil normalizirati italijanska območja ob njeni vzhodni meji. Ta načrt se je izkazal za nespobnega, da bi z dokazanimi dejstvi prodrl v globoko dušo Trsta in da bi se ukoreninil tudi med ljudmi in ne le med politično oblastno elito. V mestu so na površje znova priplavale dolgoletne težnje, kot so bile tiste liberalno-nacionalne in municipalisticne; to je pripeljalo do velikega padca vpliva lokalne Krščanske demokracije, ki je se naslonila na osrednje državno vodstvo in na garancijo o gospodarskem razvoju mesta, ki pa dejansko ni bil dosežen, in je torej izpodbijal družbeni napredek tržaške skupnosti in zmožnost, da bi se tam uveljavila nova italijanska demokratična obmejna identiteta.